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Соцреализм против романтики реализма. Что такое советское искусство 1925–1945 годов?

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artguide.com; via a Russian Facebook friend

Мария Силина об ошибках «Романтического реализма».

[JB note: For years a Russian partner and I tried to organize a exhibit comparing Norman Rockwell and Socialist Realism. But the project regrettably didn't financially work out, despite the support it obtained from persons interested in American-Russian cultural relations. See (1) (2) (3)]

Открытие выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: courtesy Музейно-выставочное объединение «Манеж»

В ноябре–декабре 2015 года в Центральном выставочном зале «Манеж» в Москве прошла выставка «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» — еще одна попытка собрать наиболее интересные работы заявленного периода. Авторы выставки — директор ГТГ Зельфира Трегулова, главный художник «Первого канала» и архитектор Дмитрий Ликин, продюсер и режиссер Эдуард Бояков — поставили одной из своих целей разрушение «клише об отсутствии художественных достоинств у этих полотен». Однако уже в самом названии выставки — один из главных мифов о советском искусстве, который так и не был развенчан в экспозиции, — миф о существовании советского искусства как единого целого. С 1925 по 1945-й в Советском Союзе прошло несколько кампаний по привлечению художников к нуждам государственной пропаганды, сменилось множество периодов совершенно разного художественного, стилистического и административного содержания. Более того, во время каждой из подобных кампаний предшествующее поколение мастеров начинало подвергаться гонениям как идеологически чуждое — но на выставке это никак не показано, все ее участники объединены в общий стройный хор.
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
Такой «неразличающий» подход как нельзя лучше демонстрирует крайне востребованное сегодня стремление к нормализации истории.Министр культуры РФ Владимир Мединский на своей открытой лекции «Мифы о революции и гражданской войне» в МГИМО в ноябре 2015 года заявил, что в гражданской войне участвовали только две силы — «белые» и «красные», но победила, по словам министра, в итоге третья сила — «историческая Россия», и в ней нет ни героев, ни антигероев[1]. Авторы «Романтического реализма» упростили в истории советской живописи то, что еще не обрело сегодня сложность и полноту профессионального осмысления. В каталоге выставки можно обнаружить буквальное обращение к советской риторике времен холодной войны: искусство авангарда было побеждено понятным зрителю искусством реализма, который как нельзя лучше подходил на роль пропагандистского искусства[2].Впрочем, эта теоретическая рамка осталась на уровне декларации; из тематических разделов, на которые была поделена выставка, и текстов каталога следует, что авангард и реализм объединили усилия, чтобы в СССР победила та самая историческая Россия, состоящая из набора «очевидных, но дорогих нашим сердцам истин» — воспетого труда, мечтаний о небе, семейного счастья и героической победы в Великой отечественной войне[3]. Подобная позиция, в основе которой лежит обращение к «вечным ценностям», позволят авторам игнорировать и замалчивать многие аспекты истории советского искусства: феномен пролетарского искусства в 1928–1932 годы, с его оригинальной трактовкой наглядной агитации; репрессии в художественных кругах в 1936–1939 годах, приведшие к самоцензуре многих авторов; создание сталинской индустрии искусства 1936–1953 годов, в которой массовое производство станковой живописи парадоксальным образом подкреплялось разговорами об особом вдохновении художника, результатом которое является появление шедевров. Под знаменем некоего единого «романтического реализма» авторы выставки попытались представить плохо объединяемые драматичные перипетии истории советского искусства как единый дискурс о художественно интересных вещах. В настоящей статье я хотела бы разрушить иллюзию единства необъединяемого, рассмотрев некоторые из многочисленных эпизодов смены идеологических директив и последующих за ними репрессий.
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
Почти все работы, показанные на «Романтическом соцреализме» хрестоматийны; многие из них начали попадать в сборники советского искусства еще с конца 1930-х годов. Работы Исаака Бродского, Александра Дейнеки и Кузьмы Петрова-Водкина самые «чистокровные» по родословной, они как были признаны в середине 1930-х эталонными образцами соцреалистической живописи, так и кочевали из книги в книгу[4]. Бо́льшая часть этих полотен находится в постоянных экспозициях центральных музеев — Государственной Третьяковской галерее в Москве (ГТГ) и Государственном Русском музее в Санкт-Петербурге (ГРМ), и в пересмотре художественной ценности не нуждается, зато их присутствие на выставке придают ей вес. Другая часть работ, показанных в Манеже (в основном, это картины, написанные в 1928–1937 годах), находится в коллекции Государственного музейно-выставочного центра РОСИЗО. Эти произведения активно вводились в художественный оборот с 2000-х годов и принимали участие в таких выставках, как «Коммунизм — фабрика мечты» (кураторы Борис Гройс и Зельфира Трегулова, Франкфурт-на-Майне, 2003–2004), «Борьба за знамя» (куратор Екатерина Деготь, Москва, 2008), «Соцреализм. Инвентаризация архива» (куратор Зельфира Трегулова, Москва, 2009–2010). В то время когда РОСИЗО руководила Зельфира Трегулова, были подготовлены выставки соцреализма в Москве, Орле, Самаре, где также экспонировались указанные работы. Эти произведения охватывают два важных периода — формирование пролетарской культуры 1928–1932 годов и репрессий 1936–1937 годов.
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
Соцзаказ в области станковой живописи был введен на государственном уровне в 1928 году в период культурной революции 1928–1932-м. На первый план вышла новая, антиклассическая модель работы художников — теперь они были погружены будни пролетариата и откликались на актуальные события международной и советской политики. В дискуссиях и на страницах журналов провозглашался разрыв с буржуазной эстетикой, отказ от элитарности, искусство было призвано включиться в общественную жизнь. С 1928 года московский и ленинградский ВХУТЕИНы стали выпускать художников-пропагандистов. Именно молодых выпускников вузов, учеников Ильи Машкова, Роберта Фалька, Давида Штеренберга, привлекали к работе над созданием пролетарской культуры. В этот период получили заказы Екатерина Зернова, Василий Купцов, Константин Вялов, представленные на выставке в Манеже. Их командируют на стройки первой пятилетки (1928–1932), на производство и строящиеся заводы. Классические формы монументального и станкового искусства получают неклассические трактовки: живопись и скульптура становятся новыми видами агитационного искусства, выполненными в разнообразных модернистких стилях. Так, рождается пролетарская живопись, выполненная в традициях французского постимпрессионизма, немецкого экспрессионизма, новой вещественности, неоархаики, использующая супрематические и конструктивистские приемы в живописи фигуративного модернизма. Фактически началось формирование политически ангажированной, но художественно независимой среды. Историю взаимоотношений художественных групп, которые (безуспешно) боролись за право говорить от лица партии, еще предстоит пересмотреть. Это искусство, питавшееся из большого числа теоретических и стилистических источников, не нашло места ни в истории искусства второй половины 1930–1950-х годов, ни в появившейся к 1980-м годам концепции «авангардное — тоталитарное»[5]. Низкое качество и сиюминутная политическая направленность многих работ и сейчас ошибочно воспринимаются как продукт сталинской эпохи 1936–1953 годов, но на выставке в Манеже тематический принцип полностью устранил какую-либо проблемность и оригинальность этого периода.
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
В 1932–1935 году происходило постепенное формирование новой институциональной и идеологической структуры творческой жизни, начавшееся с объединения всех художественных организаций в 1932-м. Тогда же стали применять термин «социалистический реализм»[6]. Пролетарское искусство 1928–1932 годов и его теоретические обоснования, антиклассическая, марксистская эстетика канули в небытие. В 1933 году Осип Бескин, ответственный редактор двух центральных журналов по искусству — «Искусство» и «Творчество», — инициировал травлю художников-формалистов Давида Штеренберга, Александра Тышлера и Александра Лабаса[7]. Хотя работы этих авторов представлены на «Романтическом реализме», описанный выше сюжет авторами проекта был также опущен как несущественный для истории художественного качества советской живописи 1925–1945 годов.
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
После убийства Сергея Кирова в 1934 году близость политических репрессий заставила художников действовать в условиях самоцензуры.Юрий Пименов, бывший в начале 1930-х последователем немецкого экспрессионизма, с середины 1930-х резко поменял направление своей художественной практики и тем вписал себя в пантеон соцреалической живописи, но очевидно, что его профессиональное мастерство никуда не делось, так же как и профессионализм других ведущих тогда соцреалистов — Александра Самохвалова и Самуила Адливанкина. Сумевшие интегрироваться, выжить, не сломаться в новой сталинской системе, художники могли продолжать работать и давать художественно интересные картины. Но вопрос того, какой ценой доставалась им возможность работать, не теряет своей остроты, так же как и разговор о профессионализме художников из экспозиций ГТГ и ГРМ без упоминания условий их работы.
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
С января 1936 года начала формироваться кампания против формализма и натурализма.В партийной газете «Правда» нападают на формалистов и натуралистов: ряды первых ширятся, ряды вторых заполняются бывшими АХРовцами. Платон Керженцев, глава Комитета по делам искусств, определят список работ, предназначенных для демонтажа из экспозиций музеев. Кроме работ радикальных Казамира Малевича и Владимира Татлина, снимаются вещи экспонируемого в Манеже ОСТовца Алекасандра Лабаса и хрестоматийного соцреалиста Павла Соколова-Скали[8]. В 1938 году членов Московского союза художников перерегистрировали, исключая или переводя в кандидаты тех, кто не «изжил» формализм и натурализм в творчестве. Судьба художников культурной революции сложилась по-разному: критикуемый формалист Лабас с конца 1930-х работал над живописными агитационными панно на Всесоюзной сельскохозяйственной выставке 1939 года. Василий Купцов, один из учеников Павла Филонова, не выдержав психологического давления на учителя и его школу, повесился в 1935-м. Впрочем, в каталоге об этом тоже ни слова.
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
Шоковый эффект от процессов в области искусства был закреплен начавшимися политическими репрессиями. С августа 1936 года начинаются показательные суды над оппозиционерами, так называемые Московские процессы (1936–1938), которые вылились в массовые политические преследования. Аресты, самоубийства и расстрелы по политической линии шли параллельно административным репрессиям и травле художников на бесконечных собраниях. Работать в таких условиях было невозможно[9].
Протеже Иосифа Уншлихта (расстрелян в 1938-м) и Льва Троцкого (убит в 1940-м) Евгений Кацман отмечал в дневнике 1937 года: «Любопытно, что все аресты идут по линии троцкистов и белогвардецев, а вовсе не по линии натурализма и формализма», — и далее перечислял: «Михайлов — негодяй, но реалист, Шухаев — негодяй, но реалист, Фаворский — негодяй, но формалист, Эфрос — негодяй, но формалист, Бигас — формалист, троцкист, Киршон — якшается с троцкистами, но реалист — натуралист, Славинский — сволочь, формалист»[10].
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
В действительности, не стиль, не направление и не художественное качество работ делало из художников жертв. После 1936–1939 годов из истории советского искусства были выброшены огромное количество имен и произведений, многие художники пострадали из-за близости к политикам, попавшим в немилость. С конца 1930-х история советской живописи писалась как история прямого пути к реализму. В 1960-е, после процесса десталинизации, вся траектория развития советской культуры получила название ленинской, и она тоже закрепила незыблемость и приоритет реалистического метода в СССР. Однако в 1937–1939 годы репрессированы были и художники реалисты, и натуралисты[11]. Латышский стрелок Вольдемар Андерсон, художник-реалист, был репрессирован, также как и формалист Александр Древнин; художник реалист Николай Михайлов был сослан за блик на картине и т. д.[12]. Ахровцы Яков Цирельсон и Федор Коннов погибли и расстреляны за причастность к московской группе художников террористов в 1938[13]. Быть уверенным в своем будущем в то время не мог никто.
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
На эти годы приходится расцвет искусства соцреализма, созданного не просто по политическому заказу, как это было в 1928–1932 годы, но под страхом смерти. Критика, звучавшая на художественных дебатах, проходивших в эпоху культурной революции, становится небезопасной, и руководство ими переходит в руки лояльным государству служащим. Именно в этот период формируется то советское искусство, которое у поколений 1960–1980-х стало ассоциироваться с масштабной массовой политической индустрией соцреализма: оно обрело свой стиль (все тот же соцреализм), художественную организацию (Союз художников), места обитания (государственные выставки) и политические (Комитет по делам искусств, Министерство культуры) и административно-хозяйственные органы (Художественный фонд)[14].
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
Особую значимость в это период приобрели государственные художественные выставки, возникшие в сталинской системе производства живописи, успешно продержавшейся до 1980-х годов. Во второй половине 1930-х открываются выставки «Индустрия социализма» (1936–1939), «ХХ лет РККА и Военно-морского флота» (1938), ВСХВ (1935–1939), и критики провозглашают рождение соцреалистического искусства и изживание в советском обществе заблуждений формалистов и натуралистов[15]. С 1947 года государственные выставки стали ежегодными. Несмотря на разность тем, все они имели общие черты, которые легли в основу всей художественной экономики СССР. Среди них стоит отметить почти конвейерное производство художественных работ на определенные темы, на выполнение которых отводилось в лучшем случае несколько месяцев. Именно на эти выставки принимались сотни работ, большая часть из них впоследствии стала ассоциироваться с неискренней, халтурной и бесталанной работой. Это представление — «отсутствие художественных достоинств» — как раз и транслируют авторы манежной выставки, распространяя его на все довоенное искусство СССР. Однако вопросы халтуры и неискренности требуют особого внимания.
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
Искусствоведы также были скованы культурными и художественными реалиями сталинского времени, что не могло не отразиться на терминологии. С конца 1930-х в текстах и разговорах об искусстве начинает проявляться «неоклассический» подход к анализу произведений: вместо пролетарского реализма, демонстрации изменения психологии масс и отображения классовой диалектики в композициях картин речь начинает идти об идеалах вдохновленного творчества, правдивом и простом искусстве. Профессиональные журналы вместо дискуссионных статьей о современной художественной практике заполняются публикациями о русском реализме XIX века. Вместо репортажей о художниках на производстве или новых агиткампаниях цитируются Никола Буало и Дени Дидро, теоретики эпохи классицизма и Просвещения XVIII века[16]. Эти неоклассические установки входили в несомненное противоречие с укреплением и еще большим расширением индустрии социалистического искусства. В статьях, на собраниях, в университетах учили неоклассическому представлению о шедеврах, о гениальности отдельного творца, в то время как художники работали бригадами по двадцать человек и получали ежемесячную оплату по прейскурантам за квадратные метры. В послевоенные годы опыт производства социалистической массовой живописной продукции был перенесен и на присоединенные территории Западной Белоруссии, Западной Украины и Латвии[17].
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
В 1960-е годы (то есть после процесса десталинизации) неоклассические представления о вдохновленном творчестве и сопутствующем ему появлению шедевров закрепилось как в официальной, так и противостоящей официозу традиции. Советские партийные и культурные деятели сформулировали так называемый ленинизм в культуре, который подразумевал не только «понятие партийности и народности искусства, но и высокоталантливое художественное мастерство»[18]. То есть как раз настаивали на том, что политическое искусство должно быть художественным и должно создаваться вдохновением и талантом — и это именно то, о чем сегодня пишут авторы выставки в Манеже. В альтернативном партийным лозунгам дискурсе соцреализм стал ассоциироваться с халтурой, которому, соответственно, противопоставлялось искреннее, вдохновленное и настоящее искусство. Поэтому, вопреки заявлениям о пересмотре истории советской живописи, о которой авторы выставки в Манеже заявляли в сопроводительном тексте и в интервью СМИ, никакого радикального жеста не делается, они лишь продолжают эту линию рассмотрения искусства с точки зрения противопоставления «халтуры» и «вдохновения».
Вид экспозиции выставки «Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945 годов» в ЦВЗ «Манеж», Москва. 2015. Фото: Арсений Штейнер
Однако проблема сегодняшнего понимания советского искусства не в том, что в советской живописи нельзя найти художественности и таланта или, по крайней мере, профессионализма. Существует история агитационной живописи 1928–1932 годов, которая требует ее изучения как с точки зрения организационных форм работы, так и ее включенности в интернациональную историю модернисткого и социально-ориентированного искусства. Также необходим анализ сталинской живописи 1930–1950-х, которая создавалась художниками, свидетелями репрессий, в условиях двойного диктата — пропаганды шедевров и реалий конвейерного производства агитационных картин. Именно эта двойственность задавала рамки не только самого общего понятия «советской живописи», но также истории преемственности поколений довоенного и послевоенного времени, складывания неофициального и антисоветского дискурса с 1960-х годов, явлений нонконформизма и соц-арта, которые переосмысляли опыт работы советских художников.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ

  1. ^ Мединский В. В противоборстве красных» и «белых» победила третья сила — историческая Россия [Электронный ресурс] // Официальный сайт Министерства культуры Российской Федерации / Владимир Мединский. — Режим доступа: http://mkrf.ru/press-center/news/ministerstvo/vladimir-medinskiy-v-protivoborstve-krasnykh-i-belykh-pobedila-tretya-sila-istor (дата обращения: 08.12.2015).
  2. ^ Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945. Каталог выставки // автор текстов: Юлия Тарнавская. — М., 2015.
  3. ^ Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945. Каталог выставки //автор текстов: Юлия Тарнавская. — М., 2015.
  4. ^ Меликадзе Е., Сысоев П. Советская живопись // Е. Меликадзе, П. Сысоев. — М.: Искусство, 1939. 
  5. ^ Деготь Е. Эстетическая революция культурной революции / Екатерина Деготь // Борьба за знамя. Советское искусство между Троцким и Сталиным 1926–1936. — М.: PW-Autograph, 2009. — С. 44–53.
  6. ^ Избавление от миражей: соцреализм сегодня: Сб. ст. // сост. Е. Добренко. — М.: Советский писатель, 1990. — С. 119–123.
  7. ^ Бескин О. Формализм в живописи // Осип Бескин. — М.: ВСЕКОХудожник, 1933.
  8. ^ Максименко Л. Сумбур вместо музыки: сталинская культурная революция, 1936–1938 // Л. Максименко. — М.: Юридическая книга, 1997. — С. 229.
  9. ^ Ройтенберг О. Неужели кто-то вспомнил, что мы были... // Ольга Ройтенберг. — М.: Галарт, 2008.
  10. ^ Хвостенко Т. Вечера на Масловке близ Динамо: в 2 т. // Татьяна Хвостенко. — М.: , 2003. — Т. 2: За фасадом пролетарского искусства. — С. 9.    
  11. ^ Репрессированные художники, искусствоведы [Электронный ресурс] // Сахаровский центр :: Москва :: cайт Сахаровского центра / [сост. Валентина Тиханова]. — Режим доступа:http://www.sakharov-center.ru/asfcd/khudozhniki (дата обращения: 08.12.2015).
  12. ^ Галина Загянская Г. Стенограмма экстренного заседания правления МОССХ [Электронный ресурс] // ЖУРНАЛ КОНТИНЕНТ / Галина Загянская. — Режим доступа: http://e-continent.de/publication/Archive/2011y/148n/40s/ (дата обращения: 08.12.2015). 
  13. ^ Цирельсон Яков Исаакович. Живописец [Электронный ресурс] // Сахаровский центр :: Москва :: cайт Сахаровского центра / [сост. Валентина Тиханова]. — Режим доступа: http://www.sakharov-center.ru/asfcd/khudozhniki/?t=page&id=221 (дата обращения: 08.12.2015); Коннов Фёдор Данилович. Живописец, график [Электронный ресурс] // Сахаровский центр :: Москва :: cайт Сахаровского центра / [сост. Валентина Тиханова]. — Режим доступа: http://www.sakharov-center.ru/asfcd/khudozhniki/?t=page&id=78 (дата обращения: 08.12.2015).
  14. ^ Янковская Г. А. Искусство, деньги и политика: художник в годы позднего сталинизма // Г. А. Янковская. — Пермь: Издательство Пермского государственного университета, 2007.
  15. ^ Щекотов Н. Живопись. // Искусство / Н. Щекотов. — 1939. — №4. — С. 59-84; Меликадзе Е., Сысоев П. Советская живопись // Е. Меликадзе, П. Сысоев. — М.: Искусство, 1939. — C. 4; Всесоюзная художественная выставка «Индустрия социализма». Каталог выставки // Государственная Третьяковская галерея. — М.Л.: Искусство, 1939. — С. 8.
  16. ^ Бескин О. О картине, натурализме и реализме // Искусство / Осип Бескин. — 1939. — №4. — С. 5–21; Бескин О. На пути к советской классике // Искусство / Осип Бескин. — 1951. — №5. — С. 3–6.
  17. ^ Московский союз советских художников. Стенограмма Всесоюзного совещания скульпторов. 27 ноября 1940 // РГАЛИ. — Ф. 2943. — Оп. 1. — Ед. хр. 2095. — Л. 28; Kruk S. Profit rather than politics: the production of Lenin monuments in Soviet Latvia // Social Semiotics / Sergey Kruk. — 2010. — №06 (20). — P. 247–276.
  18. ^ Павлюченков А. С. Партия, революция, искусство (1917–1927) // А. С. Павлюченков. — М.: Мысль, 1985. — C. 93.

A Rash Leader in a Grave Time - Note for a lecture, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United"

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Peggy Noonan, Wall Street Journal
Excerpt:
Meanwhile Mr. Trump’s supporters, like Mr. Trump himself, appear to care nothing for the GOP. They believe America is in danger and this is no time for party loyalty. In any case they haven’t felt that loyalty for years because the party has disappointed them for years. Mr. Trump is both the expression and a deepening cause of the party’s fissuring.
The biggest reason has been the distance—the chasm—between the party elite at the top, who are more or less for illegal immigration, and the bulk of the party on the ground, who are opposed. In this case there is a chasm between elites concerned that they personally will look bigoted if they take action and voters concerned about who comes into America in the age of ISIS. It is a split, a distance; it is primarily the fault of the top, not the bottom; and Mr. Trump, who through his popularity could choose to be a bridge across the distance is instead functioning as a deepener of it.

Зельфира Трегулова: «Снобизм в себе надо изживать»

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via YA on Facebook

Зельфира Трегулова директорствует в Государственной Третьяковской галерее меньше года, но уже успела изменить образ музея в глазах публики на более динамичный и современный и поставить несколько рекордов
фото: Юрий Чичков


фото: Юрий Чичков

Вы активно участвуете в художественной жизни Москвы: только за одну неделю вы были на ток-шоу в Еврейском музее, на Artplay участвовали в дискуссии об идеальном музее с Мариной Лошак, открыли выставку «Романтический реализм» в Манеже, вас можно видеть на всех важных вернисажах. Это удивительно для директора такого большого музея. За девять месяцев вы стали медиаперсоной. Расскажите, зачем это вам и для чего это Третьяковской галерее?
Понятно, не для того, чтобы удовлетворить собственное тщеславие. В предыдущие годы я получила все, что человеку нужно, чтобы ощущать себя профессионалом. Еще в бытность свою заместителем директора Музеев Московского Кремля я часто появлялась на различных выставках. Мне интересно. Любой директор музея сегодня­ — а в особенности это касается таких музеев, как Третьяковская галерея, Русский, Эрмитаж, Пушкинский, которые представляют гигантский временной отрезок, — должен ориентироваться в том, что происходит в художественной жизни здесь, в России, и что происходит в мире. Учиться не поздно никогда, тем более если речь идет о выставках таких выдающихся художников, как Аниш Капур или Михаль Ровнер, или о визите Билла Виолы. Я рада была, что они к нам пришли. Разговор с такими людьми, и особенно в экспозиции Третьяковской галереи, открывает что-то совсем иное.
Это какой-то новый жанр: недавно вы провели экскурсию по музею и для знаменитого британского художника Аниша Капура.
Действительно, для Аниша Капура открыли закрытую Третьяковскую галерею. Это не фигура речи. Он возник в шестом часу вечера в понедельник, когда у музея выходной. У него было всего полчаса, и он решил посмотреть на иконы. Он прошел мимо Айвазовского, внимательно посмотрел на его работы. На обратном пути еще раз уточнил, кто это такой. Когда я спросила: «А что вам в этом интересно?», — он мне сказал нечто, что для меня, наверное, сейчас стало одной из новых, интересных точек зрения, на нее мы будем опираться, делая ретроспективу Айвазовского, которая откроется 28 июля 2016 года. Что именно, сейчас не скажу. Но я поняла, что снобизм в себе надо изживать. Мне кажется очень важным в ситуации абсолютной нетолерантности, партийности и приверженности какой-то косной, зашоренной точке зрения расширять фокус и смотреть на все абсолютно объективно, и, в частности, выставка в Манеже как раз немножечко и про это.
«Романтический реализм. Советская живопись 1925–1945» в Манеже — зрелище впечатляющее. Говорят, что вы эту выставку как куратор сделали за две недели. Это для вас рекорд?
Нет, за два месяца. В общем, рекорд. В своих лекциях в университете я все время говорю, что хорошие выставки делаются годами. До этого у меня пример минимального срока подготовки прекрасной выставки — это Палладио в России, которую мы сделали в РОСИЗО ровно за год сумасшедшего, каторжного труда. А здесь два месяца. Понимаете, представилась возможность сделать первую большую серьезную музейную выставку в Манеже. Это вскрыло довольно важную историю: у Министерства культуры, у федеральных музеев нет большого выставочного пространства, где можно было бы показывать масштабнейшие проекты.
За девять месяцев, что вы руководите галереей, вы всячески промоутируете «новую Третьяковку» на Крымском Валу. Там открыли вход с набережной, сделали модный музейный магазин, новый дизайн, музыкальный фестиваль во дворике. Но ощущение такое, что сами выставки современного искусства у вас на втором плане, в отличие от других музеев, которые сейчас за них хватаются как за какую-то особую соломинку, которая их приведет к новой аудитории.
Нет, это вам так кажется. Начнем с того, что наш отдел новейших течений работает очень активно. За это время состоялись две большие выставки.
Гиперреализм готовился задолго до моего прихода. Мне это было очень интересно, потому что я сама — свидетель того, как возникало это течение. Я работала во Всесоюзном художественно-производственном объединении им. Вучетича, которое организовывало всесоюзные выставки типа Мы строим коммунизм или Молодые художники в борьбе за мир в 1987 году в Манеже, когда впервые выступал Гребенщиков, когда на сцене был Артур Миллер. Это было потрясающее время, 1987 год.
Выставка была прекрасная, и мне показалось, что и Кирилл Светляков, руководитель отдела, и все сотрудники очень интересно работают и с аудиторией, и с дизайнером Алексеем Подкидышевым, который делал этот проект.
Следующая выставка Метагеография — один из самых интересных проектов в рамках Московской биеннале современного искусства. Притом что там нет каких-то громких имен и там поднято на поверхность из запасников энное количество работ художников 1930-х годов, которых я сама никогда не видела. Мы привлекаем молодую аудиторию именно на такие проекты, не говоря уже о самых различных программах, например о Ночи музеев, где мы делали акцент на том, что этот год — год 100-летия Черного квадрата Малевича, основополагающего произведения искусства ХХ столетия. Для этой аудитории была подготовлена замечательная инсталляция, посвященная Малевичу, — 3D-проекция студии Sila Sveta во дворе. И невзирая на проливной дождь, было море людей. Море!
А как новшества на Крымском повлияли на посещаемость?
Из-за ремонта кровли в Третьяковской галерее до 5 октября не было ни одной большой выставки в основном выставочном зале.Серова мы открыли 6 октября.
Если сравнить посещаемость Крымского Вала за эти месяцы с посещаемостью в 2014 году, когда в большом зале шли своим чередом выставки Наталии Гончаровой и коллекции Костаки, то у нас разница всего 4 тыс. человек. То есть при закрытом большом выставочном пространстве мы сумели привлечь очень большое количество людей.
Я вам могу открыть еще секрет по поводу посещаемости: мы продлили часы работы и ввели бесплатную среду. И она была очень эффективной. Нам важно, чтобы люди приходили на Крымский Вал, когда там не так много выставок, и шли в постоянную экспозицию. Потому что вот уж она достойна всяческого внимания.
Я имела в виду, скорее, образ галереи в тех же СМИ. Меня, например, поразило интервью, которое вы дали «Эху Москвы». Вы, как заклинатель змей, повторяли: «Серов — главный русский художник, самый лучший русский художник». Что же вы будете делать с другими русскими художниками? Вы сами чем объясняете успех у публики выставки Серова? Мне показалось, что это интервью было секретным оружием… Как говорил гипнотизер Кашпировский: «Вы заряжены на Серова».
Наверное, все-таки я немножечко колдунья. Валентин Серов — один из моих любимых художников. Интеллигентные люди в советские времена любили Серова, и тогда было очень острое ощущение, что смерть его была страшно преждевременной и оборвала какое-то невероятно интересное развитие. И я уверена в этом до сих пор, и мне кажется, что мы это продемонстрировали. Так вот, я пришла в галерею, когда над выставкой работали не меньше двух с половиной лет, и я не вмешалась в состав выставки ни на йоту. Но мне показался неправильным общий принцип решения экспозиции. Я вмешалась в это радикально, убедила переделать. Чтобы это была выставка, зайдя на которую зритель столбенел от того, что там увидел. Вот прямо сразу, с первого зала. И чтобы при этом она была легкая, прозрачная, без узких, тесных выгородок. Чтобы разворачивались самые различные перспективы, и произведения разных периодов вступали в диалог.
Я вас слушаю с наслаждением и слушала бы и слушала, но все же: кто придумал ролик с ожившей картиной «Девочка с персиками»? Это, конечно, смешно было.
Научные сотрудники сопротивлялись, но этот тизер собрал полмиллиона просмотров! Очереди на выставку стоят еще и благодаря ему. Да, кому-то может показаться смешным, но в нем нет ничего, на мой взгляд, пошлого. И сделано просто, недорого. Денег мы туда не вбухивали, и вообще на рекламу затрачена просто смешная сумма.
Эффективность социальных сетей сейчас нельзя недооценивать.
Конечно, сарафанного радио, социальных сетей и так далее. Вы знаете, даже министр, зайдя в соцсети, увидел жалобы посетителей на очереди и звонил мне в субботу: «Почему у вас работает одна касса?» Да, не предполагали, что будет такой наплыв. Думали, ну две тысячи в день. А тут как сразу бабахнуло тысяч пять в субботу. В среднем 4350 посетителей в день. Предыдущим рекордом Третьяковской галереи была выставка Левитана — 2100 человек в день. Холодно, а люди стоят. И мы бы принимали больше, но просто возможности зала и нормы соблюдения безопасности произведений ограничивают вход в здание.
Многие музеи за рубежом продают билеты заранее в Интернете.
Мы сейчас активно рекламируем, что, покупая билет онлайн, вы проходите без очереди.
Во время недавней конференции на ВДНХ, посвященной новейшим технологиям, инновациям, я была одним из спикеров. Оказалось очень полезно. (Это к вопросу о том, зачем я везде хожу.) Там мы замечательно пообщались с Лораном Гаво из Google, и вот я сейчас встречаюсь с ним в Париже, и мы уже наметили три интереснейшие программы. И еще мы будем сотрудничать с образовательным ресурсом «Арзамас».
Мы долгое время в музейном деле увлекались мультимедийными и прочими новейшими технологиями. И как всегда, оказались в ряду отстающих: весь мир уже понял, что, когда у тебя есть подлинные произведения искусства или памятники культуры, мультимедиа — средство исключительно вспомогательное, отнюдь не основное. Всюду в мире в музеях возвращаются к высказыванию с помощью подлинника. Когда живешь в этом тяжелом, очень застрессованном мире, нужно то, с помощью чего можно держаться на плаву, это своеобразный «детокс».
Вот я пришла в воскресенье на выставку Серова, потому что пришел с семьей господин Костин, первое лицо Банка ВТБ, нашего главного спонсора. Я видела, как люди выходили из галереи, отстояв перед этим два часа на улице, и у всех лица сияли. Когда я разговаривала на выставке с журналистами, все заканчивалось тем, что у многих на глазах появлялись слезы.
В конкурсе на разработку концепции развития галереи выиграла западная компания, и вы на пресс-конференции сказали, что в России специалистов такого класса и уровня нет. А каких еще специалистов в музейном деле у нас не хватает?
В принципе, аутсорсинг — это нормальная система сегодня. Те, кто считает деньги, выводят какие-то сферы деятельности на аутсорсинг. Это более эффективно и более выгодно, чем содержать у себя в штате людей на зарплате.
Каких специалистов нет? Ну, давайте начнем с самого болезненного вопроса: как раз специалистов-искусствоведов.
Удивили!
Не хочу сказать, что мое поколение было самое талантливое и замечательное, но, когда я поступала на искусствоведческое отделение в Московский университет, к моменту сдачи всех экзаменов осталось 20 человек на место. Когда поступала моя дочь в 1998 году, конкурс был 1,8 человека на место.
Когда я оканчивала университет, венцом всех мечтаний было оказаться в музее. Пушкинский музей — для тех, кто по западному, Третьяковка — для тех, кто специализировался по русскому искусству. Сейчас не так, к сожалению. Сейчас все самые яркие, самые интересные студенты идут в другие сферы: уходят в PR, в частные институции, в образовательные проекты.
Когда выставку делают люди, проработавшие в галерее многие десятки лет, их довольно сложно сориентировать на иной тип мышления. Проблема в том, что смены-то нет. А где взять других специалистов по Репину и передвижникам, которые, как ни крути, основа коллекции Третьяковской галереи? Но даже тех, кто к нам идет, иногда приходится профессионально переориентировать. Они специализировались по другому искусству, по другому периоду.
По каким русским художникам вы советуете специализироваться сейчас?
Пожалуйста, молодые люди, занимайтесь передвижниками, это очень интересно! Сегодня настал момент посмотреть на них совсем по-другому. И выявить множество интереснейших, актуальных вещей, начиная с того, что это момент начала художественного рынка в России и что это было коммерческое предприятие. О чем, естественно, в советской историографии никто даже не упоминал.
Можно заниматься «Бубновым валетом», рубежом XIX–XX веков,Александром Ивановым, в конце концов. Кроме Михаила Михайловича Алленова, никто из ярких фигур этим уже не занимается. Для меня его спецкурс в университете по Александру Иванову был переворотом сознания, как, впрочем, и спецкурс поВрубелю. Смею верить, что я была любимой ученицей. И когда я писала диплом, он в очень тяжелый для меня момент был просто как отец. Причем за меня не написал ни слова.
Может быть, выход в приглашенных кураторах?
Конечно, у нас уже есть приглашенные кураторы. Например, Аркадий Ипполитов из Эрмитажа. Он делает выставку из собраний Музеев Ватикана, которую мы принимаем осенью следующего года в обмен на выставку Библейские сюжеты в русском искусстве, которую делаем в Ватикане. Аркадий Ипполитов как раз тот человек, который может совершенно по-новому расширить любую самую традиционную тему, и при этом он специалист по итальянскому искусству, человек невероятной эрудиции.
То есть у вас такой межмузейный обмен получается?
Мы с Эрмитажем сотрудничаем. У нас есть несколько проектов, обсуждаем вопрос о том, что, возможно, станем партнерами Эрмитажа в Казани и будем там проводить выставки из собрания Третьяковской галереи. А нам нужно обязательно делать региональные проекты, потому что из-за существующей экономической ситуации в этом году у нас не было ни одной выставки в городах России. Все регионы заявили о том, что с экономической точки зрения этот проект потянуть не могут. Поступило предложение от мэра Казани и от президента Татарстана, поэтому сейчас будем над этим работать.
Вы меня извините за такой вопрос. Вот вы говорите про Казань…
Да-да-да, вот именно поэтому, когда ко мне с этим обратились, я сказала: вы знаете, я не готова открывать филиал в Казани, потому что все скажут, что я делаю это только потому, что я Трегулова Зельфира Исмаиловна, что я татарка по национальности.
Было бы интересно немножко узнать о вашей семье.
Когда моей маме в 1938 году выдавали паспорт, ее вместо Терегуловой записали как Трегулову. И слава богу, что вместоСаиды Хасановны не сделали Зинаидой Ивановной.
У меня были очень интеллигентные родители, 1919 и 1920 годов рождения, их давно уже нет в живых. Война, в общем, не способствует тому, чтобы люди жили долго. А отец мой прошел войну с 1941 по 1945 год как фронтовой оператор и снимал Потсдамскую конференцию.
Я выросла в очень правильной семье, совершенно идеалистической, что ли. В смысле соотнесения всего, что ты делаешь, с некоей высшей истиной и правилами, установленными не Господом Богом, а человечеством, притом что, вполне понятно, родители были атеисты. Я, скорее, агностик, да и полагаю, что мои родители были агностиками, просто не понимали, что это надо именно так называть.
И при этом, когда я однажды в первом классе пришла из школы с историей про Павлика Морозова, мама мне до четырех утра рассказывала историю нашей семьи. О репрессированном деде, которого взяли в 1929 году, несмотря на то что у него было восемь детей. Про то, как бабушка моя вывезла детей в Среднюю Азию, как она ночью сидела и выламывала себе золотые зубы, чтобы их продать и как-то прокормить детей. Моя мама была младшей в семье, и именно благодаря этому она могла получить образование, поскольку в 1936 году была принята та самая сталинская Конституция, которая гарантировала образование даже детям врагов народа… Да, три ее брата погибли на фронте, старший брат был все-таки арестован, ну и далее везде.
А у моих детей прадедушка с другой стороны был расстрелян в 24 часа на Лубянке как немецкий шпион. Вот. Поэтому я страшно благодарна своим родителям, что они старались меня воспитывать, давая все, что можно было дать, возя регулярно в Ленинград (первый раз я была в Эрмитаже в семь лет).
Вы редкий пример музейного специалиста интернационального уровня, а сейчас опять важны пресловутые корни, скрепы, идентичность…
Если вы хотите спросить, кем я себя ощущаю, — я ощущаю себя абсолютно русским человеком, но с бытовыми привычками татарской девушки. Обувь, когда прихожу в дом, снимаю немедленно у порога. Для татарской семьи если ты приходишь в дом и проходишь в сапогах или в туфлях — это оскорбление. Я знаю три слова по-татарски. Зато я свободно владею латышским языком, я выросла в Латвии, ну и, соответственно, английским, французским, немецким и итальянским (английским — свободно, а остальными — по мере надобности).
У вас была специализация по русскому искусству конца XIX века. А как вы попали в Музей Гуггенхайма?
Всесоюзное художественно-производственное объединение им. Вучетича сделало несколько легендарных выставок в 1980–1990-х начиная с Москвы — Парижа. В 1990 году я начала работать над выставкой Великая утопия. На той выставке было 1,5 тыс. экспонатов. Это великая выставка. Для меня это был университет и возможность работать с невероятными кураторами и с великойЗахой Хадид, архитектором выставки.
У вас такой опыт, которым не обладают многие из ваших коллег, — опыт прямого контакта с западными музеями, самыми блестящими. Не могли бы вы сформулировать несколько вещей, которым вас научило это сотрудничество?
Научило многому. Я несколько раз была на длительных стажировках в зарубежных музеях: семь месяцев в Музее Гуггенхайма в Нью-Йорке и три недели в 2010 году в Метрополитен-музее. А до этого в Гуггенхайме две краткосрочные стажировки, связанные с Великой утопией. А до этого работа над выставкой Москва — сокровища и традиции, которую мы делали со Смитсоновским институтом. Я только потом поняла, что это был мой первый кураторский проект, но хочу сказать, что эта выставка собрала 920 тыс. человек в США — в Сиэтле в рамках Игр доброй воли и в Смитсоновском институте в Вашингтоне. Меня тогда бросили, как котенка в воду, и сказали, что я должна сделать такую выставку: написать концепцию, отобрать экспонаты, договориться и так далее.
Это отличалось от советской практики?
Я очень многому научилась у моих зарубежных коллег: умению вести переговоры, общаться, договариваться, отстаивать свою позицию. Они невероятно корректные, вежливые — это форма уважения к человеку. Еще мне объяснили, что никогда нельзя быть неблагодарным и пользоваться бесплатным трудом. Если нет возможности человеку заплатить, надо ему сказать слова самой глубокой и искренней благодарности. Я всю жизнь следую этому принципу.
Видимо, вас научили и секретам общения с прессой, что у вас журналисты плачут?
Конечно, очень важная история — это отношения с прессой и спонсорами. В Музее Гуггенхайма я была посажена в кабинет заместителя директора (не нашлось другого местечка), и я видела, как они общались с прессой: прерывалось любое совещание, если приходил ведущий журналист из New York Times.
У меня был опыт общения и со спонсорами проектов, которые делал Музей Гуггенхайма, в частности выставки Амазонки авангарда.
У нас, пожалуй, осталось это тяжелое наследие советской эпохи — снобизм по отношению к людям, которые дают деньги.
Мы все делаем выставки только на спонсорские деньги. Музеи Кремля делали их только на спонсорские деньги все время, пока я там работала. Пушкинский музей был последним, кто получал государственные дотации на большие выставки благодаря невероятным усилиям Ирины Александровны, конечно, и ее авторитету.
Выставку Серова полностью финансировал Банк ВТБ. Они наши самые главные партнеры и дают деньги на самые значимые проекты. Деньги большие.
Сколько нам стоил привоз картин из Копенгагена и Парижа! Передо мной тут стояли люди и говорили: давайте откажемся, давайте откажемся. Трудно шли переговоры с датскими коллегами, пришлось даже Алексея Тизенгаузена, главу русского отделаChristie’s, привлечь. Он помог с определением страховой оценки, потому что то, что владельцы предлагали изначально, не соответствовало стоимости работ Серова. А потом он убедил их, что нам можно доверять.
Вообще похоже, что поиск денег на большие проекты — одна из главных опций музеев сейчас.
Я поняла из опыта зарубежных музеев, что в отделах по фандрайзингу работают профессионалы, но что фандрайзинг не может быть отдан на откуп только этим людям, что спонсоры, у которых просят крупную сумму, должны понимать, на что они дают деньги, что это будет за проект. Должны быть люди — кураторы, искусствоведы, которые профессионально ответят на любой вопрос и могут преподнести проект так, что меценаты раскроют кошелек. Это очень важно.

An Anthropologist Unravels the Mysteries of Mexican Migration: Note for a lecture, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United"

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news.nationalgeographic.com

Undocumented immigrants risk scorching temperatures, venomous creatures, and military surveillance to get into the U.S.

Hugh Leach, Arabist - obituary

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via KL/AF on Facebook

telegraph.co.uk

Hugh Leach in Choumert Square, Peckham
Hugh Leach in Choumert Square, Peckham Photo: Anna Katz

Hugh Leach, who has died aged 81, was a soldier, diplomat, Arabist, author, adventurer, circus impresario, and, as one writer observed, “the last of a dying breed: the great British eccentric”. 
His exploits included working for Army intelligence in Oman, accompanying Freya Stark to the backwaters of Yemen and a spell as a circus ringmaster in Egypt. Later he entertained Wilfred Thesiger at his Peckham cottage.
In 1956 Leach, then a tall, fair-haired officer in the Royal Tank Regiment, was one of the first to land at Port Said, Egypt, during the Suez Crisis. It was the start of a lifetime of adventures in the area as, after retiring from the Army, he stayed on in the region, serving with the Foreign Office in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan. Some considered this to be a veiled MI6 assignment.
While pursuing his diplomatic career Leach concurrently had a half-share in a circus, which performed alongside the Egyptian State Circus in Egypt. “We had belly dancing on stilts, tightrope-walking and a man who stood on one leg, blindfolded, and threw knives around a girl,” Leach recalled. “British Envoy Joins the Circus”, announced the Daily Express.
Leach found the circus similar to the Army, he explained, because of the high degree of discipline that was needed: “If people muck about, someone will get killed.”
Hugh Raymond Leach was born at Abingdon on May 5 1934. His father was a printer to the clergy; his mother died in childbirth while delivering him and his twin sister.
Hugh attended Abingdon School and the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, being commissioned into the Royal Tank Regiment in 1955. He was appointed assistant adjutant and after tours in Suez, Libya and Cyprus began studying at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, the FO school in Lebanon.
Leach in uniformLeach in uniform
Having learnt Arabic he took on intelligence gathering duties in Masirah and Nizwa in Oman. He described this period as among the best years of his life. “I lived with the Bedouin tribes there and they didn’t know any English at all,” he recalled later. “So unless I could say, 'Excuse me, I’d love a cup of tea’ in Arabic, I wasn’t going to get very far.
He was promoted to captain in 1961 and on retiring from the Army five years later joined the Foreign Office, where he remained for the rest of his career. He received many celebrated visitors during his various Middle East postings, including Violet Dickson, the wife of the colonial administrator HRP Dickson, and Wilfred Thesiger, who would become a friend.
“All explorers, not least Arabian ones, have a sensitivity about others trespassing on their patch,” Leach said. “Wilfred had a special rancour reserved for women trespassing on his.”
During the early 1970s Leach toured the Hadhramaut and was introduced to the work of Freya Stark, who had written an account of her own adventure in the hinterland of the southern Arabia peninsular during the late 1930s.
In 1975 he turned up at Freya Stark’s villa in Asolo, northern Italy. “During a long afternoon and evening I found we shared many interests in common,” Leach recalled, “among them a deep affection for the Arab world, the poetry of Matthew Arnold and 1930s screw-thread Leica cameras.”
Leach in Yemen in the 1970sLeach in Yemen in the 1970s
Having told Freya Stark that he was soon to depart for Sana’a, on his arrival in Yemen he received a telegram: “Arriving Wednesday, Freya.” The peculiar pair – he was 41, she was 82 – toured northern Yemen together, an expedition that Leach later chronicled in his photographic memoir, Seen in the Yemen: Travelling with Freya Stark and Others (Arabian Publishing, 2011).
By the early 1980s he was working at the British Embassy in Khartoum. Bruce Duncan, a British military adviser to the Sudanese army, recalled: “He had rented a farm on the banks of the Blue Nile at Butri. Hugh was something of an eccentric and used to sound Last Post and Reveille at the appropriate times, standing on the river bank dressed in his white dishdasha.” In Cairo he would arrive for work at the Embassy in a pony and trap.
A shopkeeper in Sana'a, photographed by Leach in the 1970sA shopkeeper in Sana'a, photographed by Leach in the 1970s
On his return from the Middle East Leach found that his expertise was in great demand. During the late 1980s he spent several years producing an extensive study of Islamic fundamentalism for the British government. He retired in 1989.
Leach’s domestic arrangements were as unusual as his career path. At some point in the 1960s he placed a personal ad in The Lady: “Retired former Army officer seeks temporary accommodation”. The response surprised him: “I got three replies, not offering a house, but asking for my hand in marriage.”
Rejecting the proposals, he bought a house in Choumert Square in Peckham where he lived for half a century. The 19th-century square, named after the Georgian landowner George Choumert, is in fact a small lane of cottages lined with gardens. Previous residents of the square have included a forger, a parfumier and a former chief justice of Zambia. Leach kept a second home in Somerset, where he enjoyed cycling on the Somerset Levels and took an interest in church affairs.
Friends noted his air of mystery and many quirks of character. He declined to enter the digital age and his interests ranged from early Christianity to photography and crystal radios. Motorbikes and vintage cars were another passion: he owned a 1926 Humber 9/20 Tourer called “Edwina”. For many years he also kept a Land Rover, which he called Martha. “Martha was always by my side through wars, insurrections, coups and rioting mobs,” he said. “She’s been bugged, shot at and even helped rescue royalty and politicians.”
Hugh Leach in later lifeHugh Leach in later life
Leach was associate director of the Academy of Circus Arts and a council member and historian of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs, of which he wrote a centennial history, Strolling About on the Roof of the World (2003). In retirement he led youth expeditions in Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan and inspired many potential Arabists by giving school talks.
He was appointed MBE (military) in 1961 and OBE in 1976. In 1998 he received the RSAA Lawrence of Arabia Memorial Medal.
Leach’s interest in the Arab world never waned. “My Arabic is still pretty good,” he said last year. “Something I love about Peckham is the mosque on Choumert Grove. I’ll often go down there for a chat. When I’m on a train everyone else will have The Times, and I’ll be reading an Arabic newspaper. I get some amusing looks.”
Leach was unmarried.
Hugh Leach, born May 5 1934, died November 14 2015

There are more museums in the U.S. than there are Starbucks and McDonalds – combined: Note for a lecture, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United"

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There are roughly 11,000 Starbucks locations in the United States, and about 14,000 McDonald's restaurants. But combined, the two chains don't come close to the number of museums in the U.S., which stands at a whopping 35,000.
So says the latest data release from the Institute of Museum and Library Services, an independent government agency that tallies the number and type of museums in this country. By their count the 35,000 active museums represent a doubling from the number estimated in the 1990s.
While most of us think of massive institutions like the Smithsonian and the Guggenheim when we think of museums, one lesson of the new data is that the majority of U.S. museums are small, nearly mom-and-pop affairs. Of the roughly 25,000 museums with income data in the file, 15,000 of them  reported an annual income of less than $10,000 on their latest IRS returns.
And these museums are literally everywhere. Below, I mapped the total number of museums per county in the U.S., in both raw number and per-capita terms.
One shocker? The nation's cultural capital, at least as measured by number of museums, isn't New York, but rather Los Angeles — a city known more for Hollywood and the Hiltons than for Holbein and history. L.A. County has 681 museums compared to New York County's 414. Chicago (Cook County), San Diego and D.C. round out the rest of the top five.
But notice also that there are barely any blank counties on the map, even in sparsely populated rural areas. Storey County, Nev., population 3,942, has 11 museums, including the Comstock History Center and the Fourth Ward School Museum. Loup County, Neb., population 576, is home to the Loup County Historical Society.
The IMLS' Mamie Bittner notes that that many of these institutions, particularly in small towns and rural areas, are historical societies and history museums. "We are in love with our history — at a very grassroots level we care for the histories of our towns, villages and counties," she says. These museums may be small, but they play outsized roles when it comes to the "informal learning" that happens outside of the classroom. She added, "These museums are the community institutions that are the cornerstones of this informal learning."
Rural counties come out on top of the per-capita figures, although this is driven largely by their small populations. If we consider only counties with at least 10,000 people, San Juan County, Wash., has the greatest number of museums on a per-capita basis. I've tabulated the top 10 below.

Most museums per 100,000 residents, among counties with a population of 10,000+

CountyStateMuseumsMuseums per 100k residents
San JuanWA21132.3
MarshallKS12120.0
ShoshoneID15118.2
HancockME61111.2
NantucketMA11105.8
BayfieldWI16105.6
BakerOR1699.9
FranklinFL1194.8
WashingtonME2990.1
KnoxME3588.5
The data also show where museums aren't. We've heard of food deserts, but how about cultural deserts? Up to 175 counties — home to 1.6 million people — don't contain any museums at all. Many of these are concentrated in the South, particularly Mississippi and Georgia. One word of caution here: Since the data file is culled from a variety of sources, including tax records, some of these counties may be home to museums that fell through the cracks of data collection; for instance, if they file their taxes under an office address that's different than their physical address.
If anything, the overall museum count is probably a conservative one. "Museums governed by state and municipal agencies or museums under the control of public universities may be undercounted," the researchers note.
Many institutions in the file are simply unclassifiable. There's the First State Antique Tractor Club in Greenwood, Del. The Idaho Forest Fire Museum in Moscow, Idaho. The Kansas Underground Salt Museum in Hutchinson, Kan. The Museum of Maritime Pets in Annapolis, Md. The Museum of Bad Art in Somerville, Mass. As Mamie Bittner puts it, "Anything you can dream up, there is a museum for that."


Christopher Ingraham writes about politics, drug policy and all things data. He previously worked at the Brookings Institution and the Pew Research Cente

Ukraine’s Fragile Status Quo

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carnegieeurope.eu; via JM on Facebook

Ukraine’s Fragile Status Quo

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Ten months after the Minsk II agreement of February 2015, which aimed to end the unrest in eastern Ukraine, a strange and delicate status quo has emerged. It seems that all the major strategic players involved in the conflict—Russia, the government of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, the West, the Ukrainian oligarchs—can well live with the current precarious state of affairs. The big wild card that could break the standstill is the Ukrainian people.
The conflict over the eastern Ukrainian provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk, where so-called rebels, equipped and directed by Russia, claim to have established autonomous regions to “protect” ethnic Russians from hostile action by the Kiev government, has all but disappeared from the headlines. This is not just because a relative calm has emerged on the frontlines, or because the war in Syria now hogs all the attention. It is also because all the major players in the Ukrainian conflict seem to have achieved roughly what they can realistically expect to achieve. All except the Ukrainians themselves.
Let’s look at Russia first. Through its proxy presence in Ukraine’s east, Moscow can ensure that Ukraine delivers the strategic goods that Russia wants from Ukraine. Moscow’s de facto veto power over Ukrainian constitutional reform will ensure that the country can’t properly settle its territorial and minority issues, thereby withholding a key success from the Poroshenko regime.
Russia can also prevent Kiev from veering too far to the West, as NATO and EU membership are basically impossible without a resolution of Ukraine’s existential internal conflict. Moscow can also escalate or de-escalate the war at will and therefore owns a powerful tool to punish Poroshenko should he go too far for Moscow’s taste.
Then there is the Poroshenko government. Kiev is not really reforming Ukraine with much vigor but can get away with it because all local alternatives look even worse to the president’s Western supporters. Despite his own shortcomings, the West is committed to Poroshenko. He has no interest in whipping up anti-Russian sentiments by getting robust in the east because he knows he is in the weaker position and does not want to see himself embarrassed by an additional Russian escalation that would only demonstrate his powerlessness.
Poroshenko, though not an oligarch in the classic, rent-seeking sense, can also expand his personal business. He can (rightfully) claim that state authority and economic activity have been restored after the meltdown that followed the ouster of former president Viktor Yanukovych. And enough superficial reform is going on for Poroshenko to claim that he is trying to improve things, and that all he needs to finish the job is more time.
In the West, Europeans can assert that their diplomacy has prevented the war in the east from boiling over to other parts of the country. They can stick to the Minsk agreement as the only plan for peace that gives them standards for organizing a technical diplomatic process, something Europeans are good at. Europeans can also continue their support for Kiev’s reform effort without having to face the ugly realities of the geopolitics behind the conflict, something they are not good at.
European investment in Ukraine is moderate, and as long as the calm holds, the EU can maintain a consensus to continue that investment. Under this status quo, Europeans can even work with Russia again, as Moscow is needed, via Syria, as a partner in the refugee crisis, an issue that is much more important to Europeans than the fate of the Ukrainians.
The Ukrainian oligarchs, in turn, have lost some influence and wealth, but essentially their business model remains intact. They not only control key industries, but they have also “learned to speak the language of the new times,” as one Ukrainian analyst put it. The oligarchs control most political parties and a large number of parliamentarians. They run their own NGOs.
Ukraine’s constitutional reform process is plotted, for the most part, by a nontransparent group outside the parliament, attached to the presidential administration, in which oligarchs have seats and decisive influence. They are the leaders of the unofficial sector, as they are now known in Ukraine—and in fact have always been in the past twenty-five years. The oligarchs don’t want to fall under Moscow’s spell, but nor do they want the boat rocked too hard. For them, some sort of middle position between the West and Russia is most lucrative. Poroshenko delivers just that. The oligarchs want it to stay that way.
The only party involved that does not like the status quo is the Ukrainian people. All of that power balancing among the big players comes at their expense. The economy is not really recovering, and nor is corruption on the way out. The culture of impunity in Ukraine remains in place, which is perhaps the most aggravating factor of all. EU membership is a distant dream, even though visa-free travel for Ukrainians entering the EU is finally forthcoming.
Observers and analysts in Kiev speak of widespread unhappiness and discontent among the Ukrainian population. That should be taken very seriously. Russians, Americans, and Europeans have been surprised before by Ukrainians who just don’t play along (at least, not all of them) in the geopolitical chess game that assigns them the role of pawns of other people’s strategies, not of players in their own right. But can the Ukrainians rise again?
Romantic Western thinking has it that Ukraine’s Maidan antigovernment movement is just waiting on the sidelines, like Jedi knights protecting the old republic, ready to come back in and save the country should things go appallingly wrong. But locals dismiss this as an illusion. “The Maidan was simple: everybody against Yanukovych. That brought together liberals, nationalists, oligarchs, students. Next time, it will not be peaceful, and it will be everybody against everybody else,” said an analyst I recently interviewed on the matter. “And there are a lot of arms in the country.”
Maybe that is slightly too dramatic a scenario. But it seems clear that the only party involved in this big game that wants real positive and substantial change is the Ukrainian people. Or at least a growing number of them. If no one else delivers on that promise, they might take things into their own hands again. The consequences could be grave, ranging from another economic implosion to increased Russian intervention to civil war. In absence of any real coercive power or willingness to change things in Ukraine, Western diplomacy should at least be mentally prepared for that kind of outcome.

While university presidents earn millions, many professors struggle

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csmonitor.com; via RW on Facebook


As the salaries of both public and private university presidents continue to rise, so do the number of adjunct professors working on wages described as 'unlivable.'

In a survey of private US universities released Sunday by the Chronicle of Higher Education, the typical president at a private university earned an annual salary of $436,429 in 2013, up 5.6 percent from the year before.
In all, 32 private university presidents earned $1 million or more in compensation in 2013. And private college presidents aren’t the only ones raking it in. The average public college president earned over $428,000 in 2014, reported the Chronicle. 
“Many times when I talk to trustees, they refer to university presidents as running companies – which they could also do if they chose to enter the private sector – so to keep a president at the university they will pay what it takes,” Sandhya Kambhampadi, the lead author of the Chronicle report, tells The Christian Science Monitor in a phone interview Tuesday.“They will pay the market value.” 
But the cushy salaries of both public and private university presidents stands in stark contrast to the lifestyle of adjunct professors, a growing demographic in institutions of higher education.

"Adjunct" is a term used for non-tenured, part-time professors, who receive no benefits, no office and typically paid between $3,000 and $5,000 per course. In 2013, NPR reported that these itinerant teachers make up 75 percent of college professors, and their pay averages between $20,000 and $25,000 annually. And this trend may be long term, as three in four college professors are not on a tenure track, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) reports.
“The core mission of the university is instruction and research,” Gwen Bradley, an AAUP senior program officer, tells The Christian Science Monitor in a phone interview Tuesday. “These should be funded first before raising presidents or coaches salaries. These [missions] should take priority.” 
According to a 2015 study by the UC Berkeley Labor Center, 25 percent of part-time college faculty and their families are enrolled in a at least one public assistance program such as Medicaid or food stamps.
Most adjunct professors are forced to work two jobs to make ends meet.
“Every day I live two people’s lives and it’s fatiguing. Every day I need more time with students while being pulled away from them,” Lee Hall, an adjunct professor for the Legal Education Institute at Widener University, writes in an opinion piece for the Guardian. Prof. Hall writes that she makes about $15,000 per year. Widener's president, James Harris, made $997,140 in 2013
And it’s not a factor of professors preferring part-time employment – more than 73 percent of part-time professors want full-time gigs but can’t find one, a 2015 study published in The Journal of Higher Education reports. 
“I thought my time here would eventually be rewarded with an offer of full-time employment. I was wrong, and should have known better,” former adjunct professor Dana Biscotti Myskowski writes on blog in November. “I can’t teach for poverty wages and zero benefits any longer … It’s an unlivable wage.” 
But the facts still stand. The private colleges with the highest-paid presidents also have the highest percentage of adjunct professors.
A 2014 study by the Institute for Policy Studies found a similar trend among schools with the highest paid presidents: part-time adjunct faculty increased 22 percent faster than the national average.
Three universities in New York – Columbia University, New York University, and the New School – had some of the most adjunct faculty at 60, 79 and 91 percent respectively. And according to the recently released Chronicle survey, all three university presidents at these schools earned over $1 million each in 2013.

UA adjunct faculty walkout
KOLD - Tucson, AZ


Choose Your Own Identity: Note for a lecture, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United"

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By BONNIE TSUI DEC. 14, 2015, New York Times

Image from article, with caption: A series of photographs from "The Hapa Project" by the artist Kip Fulbeck

I never realized how little I understood race until I tried to explain it to my 5­
year­old son. Our family story doesn’t seem too complicated: I’m Chinese-American
and my husband is white, an American of English­-Dutch-­Irish
descent; we have two children. My 5-­year-­old knows my parents were born in
China, and that I speak Cantonese sometimes. He has been to Hong Kong and
Guangzhou to visit his gung­-gung, my father. But when I asked him the other
day if he was Chinese, he said no.

You’re Chinese, but I’m not,” he told me, with certainty. “But I eat
Chinese food.” This gave me pause. How could I tell him that I wasn’t talking
about food or cultural heritage or where we were born? (Me, I’m from
Queens.) I had no basis to describe race to him other than the one I’d taken
pains to avoid: how we look and how other people treat us as a result.

My son probably doesn’t need me to tell him we look different. He’s a
whir-­in-­a-­blender mix of my husband and me; he has been called Croatian and
Italian. More than once in his life, he will be asked, “What are you?” But in
that moment when he confidently asserted himself as “not Chinese,” I felt a
selfish urge for him to claim a way of describing himself that included my side
of his genetic code. And yet I knew that I had no business telling him what his
racial identity was. Today, he might feel white; tomorrow he might feel more
Chinese. The next day, more, well, both. Who’s to say but him?

Racial identity can be fluid. More and more, it will have to be: Multiracial
Americans are on the rise, growing at a rate three times as fast as the country’s
population as a whole, according to a new Pew Research Center study released
in June. Nearly half of mixed­-race Americans today are younger than 18, and
about 7 percent of the U.S. adult population could be considered multiracial,
though they might not call themselves that. The need to categorize people into
specific race groups will never feel entirely relevant to this population, whose
perceptions of who they are can change by the day, depending on the people
they’re with.

Besides, the American definition of race has always been in flux. For one
thing, context mattered: In 1870, mixed-­race American Indians living on
reservations were counted as Indians, but if they lived in white communities
they were counted as whites. Who was “white” evolved over time: From the
1870s to 1930s, a parade of court rulings pondered the “whiteness” of Asian
immigrants from China, Japan and India, often changing definitions by the
ruling in order to exclude yet another group from citizenship. When mixed-race
people became more prevalent, things got murkier still. Who the U.S.
Census Bureau designated “colored” or “black” varied, too, before and after
slavery, and at times including subcategories for people of mixed race, all
details often left up to the whims of the census taker. In 1930, nativist
lobbyists succeeded in getting Mexicans officially labeled nonwhite on the
census; up until then, they were considered white and allowed citizenship. By
1940, international political pressure had reversed the decision. It wasn’t until
2000 that the Census Bureau started letting people choose more than one race
category to describe themselves, and it still only recognizes five standard racial
categories: white, black/African-­American, American Indian/Alaska Native,
Asian, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander.

Racial categories formed the historical basis for so many of America’s
societal and political decisions, and yet even the Census Bureau has admitted
that its categories are in flux, recognizing that race is not a fixed, “quantifiable”
value but a fluid one. White or black or Asian America isn’t monolithic and
never was. Everyone’s story can be parsed ever more minutely:
Haitian-Hawaiian, Mexican-­Salvadorean, Cuban-Chinese. And when you start mixing
up stories, as my family has, much of the institutional meaning of race falls
away; it becomes, instead, intensely individual. In a strange way, the renewed
fluidity of racial identity is a homecoming of sorts, to a time before race — and
racism — was institutionalized.

In the San Francisco Bay Area, where I live, the once­-derogatory term
hapa— from the Hawaiian word for “half”; it’s a Hawaiian pidgin term long
used to refer to people of mixed-­race background — is now part of the
everyday lexicon. In my sons’ preschool and kindergarten classes, hapa is fast
becoming the norm because there are so many mixed­-race children in
attendance. There’s power in the word: a reclaiming of territory,
a self- determination. To me, the idea of hapa as a racial definition is inclusive rather
than exclusive and thus a step in the right direction. The term is mostly used to
refer to people of part Asian heritage, but increasingly it’s used for anyone of
mixed race. And it’s a term that tends to be a self-­identifying choice, rather
than an outside imposition.

There’s a difference, you know. A critical element in the long­-running
Hapa Project, for which the artist and filmmaker Kip Fulbeck traveled the
country and photographed thousands of multiracial people, is that photo
subjects speak for themselves. One woman states to her observers: “I am a
person of color. I am not half-­‘white.’ I am not half­-‘Asian.’ I am a whole
‘other.’” There is a resistance to fragmentation, a taking control of the
narrative. Fulbeck, as a mixed-­race person himself, came up with the idea as a
kid in elementary school, when he struggled with what he calls the “check one
box only” question. Here, we aren’t talking about getting rid of the boxes or
just adding more boxes but creating more flexible ones that can hold more
going forward.

There will be surprises in my own household when it comes to racial
identity. According to the Pew study, biracial Asian­-whites are more likely to
identify with whites than they are with Asians. This line made me sit up: It
never occurred to me that my sons could possibly identify only as white. I’m
forced to think more carefully about what it is that actually makes me
uncomfortable with that idea: It’s not that I want my sons to experience
discrimination, but if they do choose to identify as white, there is something
about being a racial minority in America that I would want them to know. As a
child, I most wanted to fit in. As a young adult, I learned how I stood apart and
to have pride in it. In the experience of being an “other,” there’s a valuable
lesson in consciousness: You learn to listen harder, because you’ve heard what
others have to say about you before you even have a chance to speak.

But the truth is, I can’t tell my sons what to feel: more white than Asian,
more Asian than white, neither, both. Other. I can only tell them what I think
about my own identity and listen hard to what they have to tell me in turn. If
that isn’t practicing good race relations, what is? Much as I hate to admit it,
what they choose to be won’t necessarily have to do with me. Because my sons
are going to be the ones who say who — not what — they are.

Bonnie Tsui is a writer in Berkeley, Calif., and the author of 
“American Chinatown: A People’s History of Five
Neighborhoods.”

‘Sunni front’ against terror is a bad idea

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Murat Yetkin, hurriyetdailynews.com

image from
Excerpt:

U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has praised a new “Saudi-led Islamic anti-terrorism alliance” as being “in line with U.S. calls for a greater Sunni role” in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). ...
The idea of establishing a “Sunni front” is not something that has just come up over the last few weeks. It is an idea suggested by King Salman of Saudi Arabia to international leaders, including Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan, who went to Riyadh to congratulate him on his ascension to the throne in March this year. A Sunni front consisting of 10 countries was indeed formed by the end of March to take joint action in Yemen. The aim of that Sunni front was proposed by Salman as a stand against “Shiite expansionism backed by Iran” in the Middle East.
Now the new alliance led by the Saudis has set its target as the fight against ISIL and generally against terrorism. It does not consist only of Arab countries (also including Pakistan, Senegal, Malaysia and Bangladesh), and says it is in line with the “Sunni” nature of the U.S. call.
The alliance includes Lebanon, which is home to a strong Hezbollah presence, in line with Iran, the world’s most important Shiite power. However it does not include Iraq, which also has a strong Shiite presence, raising questions about how to fight against a force that occupies almost a third of Iraq without the consent of Baghdad. There are other questions too, such as over which government in Libya will participate, or how Egypt and Turkey will cooperate without having diplomatic ties.
It seems like the “Sunni front” idea is simply another public diplomacy effort, rather than an effective organization.
But apart from it being a bad idea to establish a Sunni front in the fight against terrorism, what the Middle East does not need is any new emphasis on the sectarian dimension of the existing turmoil. Why on earth does the U.S. feel obliged to take sides in the sectarian divide within Islam? And why does it praise the leading role of Saudi Arabia, which is currently ISIL’s main human resources pool, and from which many radical movements - from the Wahhabis to al-Qaeda - have emerged?
And why on earth is Ankara is becoming part of this futile but dangerous idea of a “Sunni front,” while at the same time repeating the rhetoric that Turkey is against and above sectarian differences?
It is understandable that President Obama wants a local, Arab collaborative effort against ISIL. But trying to do that along the lines of the already explosive sectarian divide within Islam is unlikely to help calm the rising regional tension.

Restricted Areas: Photographer Captures The Eerie Abandoned Remains of Soviet Technology

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thevintagenews.com; via MC; see also.

What once were the symbols of Russia’s Cold War military might, now are abandoned, eerie ghosts in the snow.
These stunning images are part of the Restricted Areas,  the photo project by Russian photographer Danila Tkachenko, which shows lost remnants of the USSR‘s materiel and technology programmes.
This is how Tkachenko describes the project:
The project “Restricted Areas” is about utopian strive of humans for technological progress. Humans are always trying to own ever more than they have – this is the source of technical progress, which was the means to create various commodities, standards, as well as the tools of violence in order to keep the power over others. Any progress comes to its end earlier or later, it can happen due to different reasons – nuclear war, economic crisis or natural disaster. For me, it’s interesting to witness what is left after.
Tkachenko spent three months travelling Russia in the depths of winter in order to complete the photo series.
“I used a Mamiya 7, with a closed aperture and long exposure,” he told Wire.uk
Tkachenko won the World Press Photo award for his work and Restricted Areas will be published in November.
See the haunting images below and check out more of his work on his website.


1
Airplane – amphibia with vertical take-off VVA14. The USSR built only two of them in 1976, one of which has crashed during transportation. Danila Tkachenko ©



2
Former residential buildings in a deserted polar scientific town specialised on biological research. Danila Tkachenko ©



3
Tropospheric antenna in the north of Russia – the type of connection which has become obsolete. There were many of them built in far North, all of them deserted at the moment.Danila Tkachenko ©




4
Former mining town which has been closed and made a bombing trial field. The building on the photo shows the cultural center, one of the objects for bombing. Danila Tkachenko ©




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City where rocket engines were being produced in Soviet times. Was a closed city until 1992. Danila Tkachenko ©




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Deserted observatory.




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The world’s largest diesel submarine. Danila Tkachenko ©




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Stages of the space rockets..Danila Tkachenko ©




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Boiler house of a closed aerodrome. Danila Tkachenko ©




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Headquarters of Communist Party. Danila Tkachenko ©
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Antenna built for interplanetary connection. The Soviet Union was planning to build bases on other planets, and prepared facilities for connection which were never used and are deserted now Danila Tkachenko ©

source:wired

Notes on a recent USA campus controversy: God, Christians and Moslems

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Acts of Faith: Do Muslims and Christians worship the same God? College suspends professor who said yes.


"NOSTRA AETATE" and "Just for Catholics."]

Wheaton College, a prominent evangelical school in Illinois, has placed a professor on administrative leave after she posted on Facebook that Muslims and Christians “worship the same God.”
The official school statement Tuesday about associate professor of political science Dr. Larycia Hawkins’s suspension said Wheaton professors should “engage in and speak about public issues in ways that faithfully represent the College’s evangelical Statement of Faith.”
Following a protest and sit-in of about 100 people Wednesday afternoon outside his office building, President Philip Ryken announced that he would not be lifting the suspension and said he had directed the issue to Provost Stanton Jones. It wasn’t immediately clear what would happen next. 
Protesters chanted “Reinstate Doc Hawk,” “We love Wheaton!” and some evangelical women wore hijabs in solidarity.
In her Dec. 10 Facebook post, Hawkins was also wearing a hijab, explaining she planned to do so through the entire Christian season of Advent to show “human solidarity” with Muslims. She didn’t state why in her piece and did not return requests for comment to The Washington Post, but this fall has seen anti-Islam rhetoric rise sharply in the public square, including by GOP presidential candidates. Hundreds of people liked her post and more praised her intensely in comments.
“I stand in human solidarity with my Muslim neighbor because we are formed of the same primordial clay, descendants of the same cradle of humankind,” she wrote. “I stand in religious solidarity with Muslims because they, like me, a Christian, are people of the book … But as I tell my students, theoretical solidarity is not solidarity at all. Thus, beginning tonight, my solidarity has become embodied solidarity.”
She linked to a Christianity Today interview with Yale theologian Miroslav Volf on the topic. In the piece, Volf said that “all Christians don’t worship the same God, and all Muslims don’t worship the same God. But I think that Muslims and Christians who embrace the normative traditions of their faith refer to the same object, to the same Being, when they pray, when they worship, when they talk about God. The reference is the same. The description of God is partly different.”
About 40 students had drafted a letter Tuesday night asking Ryken to reconsider the suspension.
The letter quotes a coalition of concerned students and alumni. “We believe that there is nothing in Larycia Hawkins’ public statements that goes against the belief in the power of God, Christ, or the Holy Spirit that the Statement of Faith deems as a necessary component to Wheaton’s affiliation,” it reads. It asks that she be reinstated.
It wasn’t clear how long her suspension was to last. The school’s communications office said Wednesday there would be no further comment.
Hawkins, according to students at the meeting, is the only tenured black female professor at Wheaton.
Students appeared split on Wednesday. At the protest it seemed half were chanting “Reinstate Doc Hawk!” while those who seemed to support the suspension chanted “We love Wheaton!”
Luke Nelessen, a sophomore, said, “The Christian faith is fundamentally different from Islamic faith and although it’s admirable what Prof. Hawkins said, I’m in no position to try to advocate for her.” Levi Soodsma, a senior, said, “I trust Ryken and what he decides to do. Student leaders don’t stand for all students.”
At the meeting Tuesday night, the focus was on concern for free speech and thought.
Sophomore Connor Jenkins said the professor “opened up a conversation and was shut down.”
Others expressed concern about what the suspension implied for future faculty expressions of opinion on social media.
A Wheaton staff member who spoke on the condition of anonymity said the suspension “sets a precedent for what professors can post on their Facebook page. If Dr. Hawkins is being used as a scapegoat, that will send a message to those of us who are employed full time.”
The suspension took place less than a week after Wheaton College student leaders published an open letter in their student newspaper denouncing recent controversial comments by Liberty University President Jerry Falwell. Speaking to thousands of students about terrorism, Falwell urged them to arm themselves, saying it would “end … those Muslims.” He later said he meant only violent radicals. 
The Wheaton administration later issued a statement praising that open letter, saying school leaders agree with students’ effort to “address our nation’s challenges through respecting the dignity of all people, rejecting religious discrimination, and pursuing the peace that triumphs over hostility.”
Kirkland An is editor-in-chief of the Wheaton Record at Wheaton College

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DECLARATION ON THE RELATION OF THE CHURCH TO NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS NOSTRA AETATE PROCLAIMED BY HIS HOLINESS POPE PAUL VI ON OCTOBER 28, 1965 [Excerpt:]

The Church, therefore, exhorts her sons, that through dialogue and collaboration with the followers of other religions, carried out with prudence and love and in witness to the Christian faith and life, they recognize, preserve and promote the good things, spiritual and moral, as well as the socio-cultural values found among these men.

3. The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all- powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth,(5) who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they revere Him as a prophet. They also honor Mary, His virgin Mother; at times they even call on her with devotion. In addition, they await the day of judgment when God will render their deserts to all those who have been raised up from the dead. Finally, they value the moral life and worship God especially through prayer, almsgiving and fasting.

Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have arisen between Christians and Moslems, this sacred synod urges all to forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom. ...

5. Cf St. Gregory VII, letter XXI to Anzir (Nacir), King of Mauritania (Pl. 148, col. 450f.) ...

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DO CATHOLICS AND MUSLIMS WORSHIP THE SAME GOD?


[From:  "Just for Catholics" is an evangelical and evangelistic ministry - evangelical (or Protestant) because we uphold the Holy Scripture as our only infallible rule of faith, and because we believe in salvation by grace through faith in Christ alone; it's evangelistic because we want to share the evangel (the gospel, good news) with others, especially with Catholics whom we know and love dearly. This work is not authored by Roman Catholics, but it is intended especially for Catholics].

Catholicism and Islam are monotheistic religions, that is, both believe that there is but one God. However, that does not necessarily imply that they worship the same God. Two men may be married to one woman, but that does not mean that they are married to the same woman. So, the question is whether Catholics and Muslims worship the same one God.

The modern Catholic Church has defined her relations to non-Christian religions in a document entitled Nostra Aetate. The section on Islam begins thus:

The Church regards with esteem also the Muslims. They adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men.

While it does not state explicitly that 'the one God' adored by the Muslims is the true and living God, this seems to be the natural implication. For why would Rome commend Muslims for this belief if their God was considered a false deity? Indeed, unlike their ancestors, many modern Catholics are convinced that they and Muslims worship the same God.

Is this true? Is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ the same as Allah? What does the Bible teach about God? What does the Quran say?

The True and Living God

Following the ordinance of our Lord, Christians are baptised in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. The baptismal formula of the initiation rite reflects the Christian doctrine of the holy Trinity. The disciples are baptized in the singular name of God (for God is one), and yet, three distinct persons are mentioned, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

The biblical doctrine on the Trinity is correctly expressed in the Nicene and Athanasian creeds:

We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all that is, seen and unseen. We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of God, eternally begotten of the Father…We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of life…

Now the catholic faith is that we worship One God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity, neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the substance. For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, is One, the Glory equal, the Majesty coeternal.

These definitions were forged in the furnace of great controversies in the early church. Heretics troubled the church with false doctrines about God, especially Arius, who denied the Deity of Christ. In response, the orthodox Fathers laboured in the Scriptures to formulate the true doctrine of God. They understood the fundamental importance of this doctrine, and rightly warned that: 'This is the catholic faith, which except a man shall have believed faithfully and firmly he cannot be in a state of salvation.'

The importance of the doctrine of the Deity of Christ cannot be overstated. Unless the Son is truly God and 'one with the Father', Christians would be idolaters, for we regard Jesus as our Lord and Saviour and gladly worship him. If Jesus were not God, we would be found trusting in a creature for our salvation. But we confess that Jesus is not merely another prophet, but the Son of God. The Jews in hid day understood well what he meant by that title: 'For a good work we do not stone You, but for blasphemy, and because You, being a Man, make Yourself God' (John 10:33). They did not believe his claim to Deity and condemned him to death for blasphemy. But Christians understand his claim and believe him; we trust and worship the Son of God; we live and die for our Lord. For in Christ we know God in truth:

And we know that the Son of God has come and has given us an understanding, that we may know Him who is true; and we are in Him who is true, in His Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life (1 John 5:20, 21).

The Son is the true God; any other god is an idol.

The Quran

Islam vehemently rejects the doctrine of God as revealed in Holy Scriptures.

Islam denies the Trinity:

Certainly they disbelieve those who say: Surely Allah is the third (person) of the three; and there is no god but the one God, and if they desist not from what they say, a painful chastisement shall befall those among them who disbelieve (Sura 5:73).

O People of the Scripture! Do not exaggerate in your religion nor utter aught concerning Allah save the truth. The Messiah, Jesus son of Mary, was only a messenger of Allah, and His word which He conveyed unto Mary, and a spirit from Him. So believe in Allah and His messengers, and say not 'Three' - Cease! (it is) better for you! - Allah is only One Allah. Far is it removed from His Transcendent Majesty that He should have a son (Sura 4:171).

Islam denies the Father and the Son:

The Christians say: The Messiah is the son of Allah; these are the words of their mouths; they imitate the saying of those who disbelieved before; may Allah destroy them (Sura 9:29-30).

It does not befit GOD that He begets a son, be He glorified (Sura 19:35).

Islam denies the Deity of Christ:

The Messiah, Jesus the son of Mary, was no more than God’s apostle (Sura 4).

They do blaspheme who say: Allah is Christ the son of Mary (Sura 5:72).

And when Allah saith: O Jesus, son of Mary! Didst thou say unto mankind: Take me and my mother for two gods beside Allah? he saith: Be glorified! It was not mine to utter that to which I had no right (Sura 5:116).

In blasphemy indeed are those that say that Allah is Christ the son of Mary (Sura 5:17).

Clearly then, the Quran denies:

1. The Trinity;
2. The Sonship of Christ;
3. The Deity of Christ.

The conclusion is inevitable: the god of Islam is not the same God of the Holy Scriptures. Christians do not adore the same God as Muslims. Muslims are not merely ignorant of the Triune nature of God and the Deity of the Son: the Quran explicitly negates the doctrine of Christ as taught in the Bible. Rather than adoring God with us, Muslims pray to their god that he might destroy us because of our faith in Christ, the Son of God. 'The Christians say: The Messiah is the son of Allah; these are the words of their mouths; they imitate the saying of those who disbelieved before; may Allah destroy them' (Sura 9:29-30).

The Catholic Position

The Roman Catholic Church upholds the doctrine of the Trinity (Catechism paragraphs 261-267). It is therefore astounding that the Catechism contradicts everything the Catholic Church has taught about God and states that Catholics and Muslims worship the same God:

The Church’s relationship with Muslims. The plan of salvation also includes those who acknowledge the Creator, in the first place among whom are the Muslims; these profess to hold the faith of Abraham, and together with us they adore the one, merciful God, mankind's judge on the last day (Catechism of the Catholic Church, paragraph 841, quoting Lumen Gentium 16, November 21, 1964).

According to the Catechism, 'together with us (Catholics) they (Muslims) adore the one, merciful God.' Pope John Paul II repeats this statement even more clearly. Addressing Muslim youths, the Pope said: 'We believe in the same God, the one and only God, the living God, the God who creates worlds and brings creatures to their perfection' (What Dialogue Means for Catholics and Muslims, US Conference of Catholic Bishops, http://www.usccb.org/seia/brunett.htm).

How could Catholics and Muslims worship the same God since Muslims deny the Trinity, the Sonship and the Deity of our Lord? Quite frankly, the statement that Catholics and Muslims adore the same God is false. I will not speculate on the motives of the modern Catholic hierarchy for making this false assertion. However, it should be evident to every Catholic who has complete confidence in the infallibility and unchangeableness of the Roman magisterium, that in fact the Vatican's teaching on this matter has changed and that it is both fallible and mistaken.

Dr Robert Reymond comments on the odd stand of Roman Catholicism on Islam:

I should note in passing that Islam’s doctrinal hostility to Biblical Christianity apparently does not bother the Roman Catholic Church, for Rome declared in its 1994 Catechism of the Catholic Church (paragraph 841) that Muslims are included within God’s plan of salvation because they 'acknowledge the Creator,...profess to hold the faith of Abraham, and together with [Christians]...adore the one merciful God [Muslims and Christians hardly 'adore' the same 'one merciful God'].' Never mind that Islam’s Allah is not the triune God of the Old and New Testaments; never mind that Muslims think our Trinity is made up of God, a human Jesus, and Mary his mother, the last two of whom we blasphemously worship along with God; never mind that they deny that Jesus Christ is the divine Son of God and that he died on a cross a sacrificial death for his people’s sin and rose again because of their justification; never mind that Muslims believe that Christians are idolaters because we worship Christ who they contend was simply a human Messiah and a human prophet; never mind that they see no need for Christ’s substitutionary atonement or for that matter any substitutionary atonement at all. According to Rome’s teaching, in spite of their unbelief, Muslims are still salvifically related to the People of God and may go to Heaven as Muslims, all of which shows how serious is Roman Catholicism’s departure from Christianity (Reymond, R. What’s Wrong with Islam?).

Christian Response

The Christian response to Muslims should be twofold. Firstly, we must separate ourselves from Islam and clearly state that it is a false religion. 'Whoever transgresses and does not abide in the doctrine of Christ does not have God. He who abides in the doctrine of Christ has both the Father and the Son. If anyone comes to you and does not bring this doctrine, do not receive him into your house nor greet him; for he who greets him shares in his evil deeds' (2 John 9-11). Christians do not have any ecumenical relationship with Muslims. We cannot participate in their idolatry by saying that we worship the same God. On the contrary, we must warn them that since they do not abide in the doctrine of Christ, they do not have God.

Secondly, we have an evangelistic responsibility towards Muslims. They have been indoctrinated against the Son of God. We must proclaim Jesus, the Son of God, the Lord from Heaven, the Saviour of the World. We must proclaim that he died for our sins according to the Scriptures, that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the Scriptures. This is our message to Muslims, and to the rest of the world, 'He who believes in the Son has everlasting life; and he who does not believe the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abides on him' (John 3:36).

© Dr Joseph Mizzi. Permission is given to reproduce and distribute this article in any format provided that the wording is not altered and that no fee is charged. Please include the following statement on distributed copies:
© Dr Joseph Mizzi. Website: www.justforcatholics.org. Used by permission.

Facebook Comment on a water-throwing incident in the independent Republic of Ukraine

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Spat between Arsen Avakov and Mikheil Saakashvili follows a brawl between an MP and the prime minister last week
THEGUARDIAN.COM|BY SHAUN WALKER

John Brown Re this recent ethnically Armenian [see] -Georgian [see]  Russian-language cultural exchange by two devoted citizens of Ukraine, slava bogu [thank God in Russian] that water, not горілка [see], was wasted (with apologies to environmentalists). ..smile emoticon
LikeReply4 minsEdited

Evelyn Lieberman - A Remembrance

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publicdiplomacycouncil.org

Wednesday, December 16th 2015
Secretary Albright and Under Secretary Lieberman unveil plaque at USIA
Evelyn S. Lieberman, the first Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs from 1999 to 2001, passed away December 12 in Washington D.C.
Several things impressed me from the start about Evelyn Lieberman.  Like many people successful in politics, she was a quick, accurate judge of character. Despite coming to State directly from that insular environment at 1600 Pennsylvania, she quickly built rapport with FSO’s and Civil Service staffers.  She brought people into her confidence and listened to their ideas.  An effective leader, she understood how sharing information and insight empowers and strengthens your own staff.  She often returned from intimate late afternoon discussions down the hall in S to share with us the Secretary’s interests, actions and goals. 
My own relationship with Evelyn (for that’s what she insisted we all call her) began the day I was called up to meet with her. Until then I was the USIA area director for Europe who had come over to State in the merger as the director of public diplomacy for Europe.  EUR Assistant Secretary Marc Grossman genuinely appreciated what public diplomacy brought to the Department’s work.  He and his DASes (deputy assistant secretaries) treated me as an equal, welcomed my staff, and made us all feel part of the EUR team.
So it was with some mixed emotions that I went up to the seventh floor that afternoon.  Marc told me she wanted me to join her staff, and he would not stand in the way.  He even confided that he thought it a good idea, because “she needs help.”
What I did not expect was the honesty and candor with which Evelyn Lieberman made her case.  There wasn’t a lot of preliminary “getting to know you” conversation.  Pretty quickly, she cut to the chase – she had a strong staff of trusted people she had brought from the White House and one excellent USIA  employee, Rick Ruth, upon whom she relied.  But, she recognized that she did not have an ear for the Foreign Service’s issues.  Nor did she have entrée into the Department’s storied “old boy” network – the ties among  senior officers who knew one another, had served together, and who made things happen (or not happen) in Main State.  Most importantly, she explained that she needed help understanding and speaking the language of Ambassadors, PAO’s, IO’s, CAO’s , the capabilities and uses of embassies, the whole foreign policy network. I agreed to try to help.
Evelyn Lieberman was new to all this.  Yes, she had been deputy chief of staff at the White House, an intimate friend of the President and the First Lady, a press spokesman for Joe Biden, and a confidant of all the power people in the West Wing. She was already a personal friend of the Secretary of State and well known to her inner circle.  Better credentials than those are on C Street.
As Rick Ruth says of Evelyn, “she was the toughest-minded, fairest person I ever knew.  She was funny and irreverent, but had a temper. She was formal and meticulous, and also deeply caring.”
She especially cared about getting the USIA-State merger right, and I soon learned that Evelyn Lieberman was a fighter.  There were many aspects of the USIA merger into State that were undecided and needed negotiation.  What would happen to USIA’s buildings and real estate including PAO residences? Where would discretionary program monies go? Who would get USIA’s decision-making authority?  What would happen to personal  and bureaucratic rank?  Where to put research  and training capabilities? She won a lot of battles through sheer tenacity and good arguments. 
One she lost, unfortunately, was the struggle to convert USIA’s Area Directors into Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the regional bureaus at State.  It would have been logical in terms of pre-existing rank and responsibilities.  At State, however, L and M argued that Congress had placed a numerical limit on the Department’s DAS positions, and they were loath to re-allocate any of those precious DAS-slots to the USIA merger. Evelyn went back repeatedly, even directly to the Secretary, to make the case.  She argued it that would cost the Department dearly to decapitate the public diplomacy cone -- just when the expertise and skills of those senior USIA officers was needed most.  That one, she lost. 
But other battles she won.  As Rick Ruth reminds me, “Evelyn focused intently on the possible and realistic.” He recalls that, having been sworn in as Under Secretary in October 1999 near the end of President Clinton's second term, she would say to audiences with startling candor and phrasing: "I have 15 months before I die."  ‎Therefore she focused most on the managerial and personnel aspects of the merger--making sure everyone from USIA had a job at State, getting PD authorities clearly established, ensuring that the new PD Under Secretary was seen and respected as an equal on Mahogany Row.
As the Clinton Administration drew to a close, Evelyn Lieberman proposed the idea of a White House Conference on “Culture and Diplomacy” as a way to lay down some lasting markers about public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy. The idea was to engage the Secretary of State as well as the White House and some significant foreign personalities in a forthright discussion of America’s engagement abroad.  Even with Secretary Albright’s backing, it took no small amount of persuasion at the White House staff level to sell the concept.  Even then, the President’s chief of staff vowed that “the President would not talk about culture in public until after the election.”   Under Secretary Lieberman, like a tenacious bulldog, didn’t let go until they agreed. 
The conference was set for November 28, 2000 in the East Room at the White House, with the President, Mrs. Clinton, Vice President and Mrs. Gore, a bevy of international Nobel laureates like Wole Soyinka, Medal of Freedom winners, and about 300 distinguished Americans including Yo Yo Ma and Rita Dove.  (At the last moment, I was asked to pick up Meryl Streep from National Airport and escort her to the pre-conference dinner on the 8th floor at State. I’d come to work by Metro and didn’t have a car.  The Oscar-winning actress was, I assure you, perfectly nonplussed to be driven through the streets of Foggy Bottom and waved into the Department’ basement parking lot in a friend’s big white Chevrolet pickup truck.)  
At the conference, participants debated the importance of art and culture in diplomacy, and how it affects globalization. The President, Mrs. Clinton and Secretary Albright alternated playing the roles of facilitators.  The President, obviously enjoying himself in the midst of this assemblage of stellar intellectuals, creatives, artists, and thinkers, pushed the discussion toward the role of the Internet in exchanging culture, how exposure to other cultures enriches America, how culture spurs economic development, and the lasting impact of academic and cultural exchanges.  The President candidly described the formative impact his  own 1968 Rhodes scholarship made on his own political awareness and intellectual development.
As the guests departed (more left in limousines than in pick up trucks) and the White House staff stacked the chairs to restore the East Room’s normal order, it occurred to me that, for someone who had barely heard of public diplomacy a year before, Evelyn Lieberman had figured it out darned well.    

Author: Brian Carlson

Diplomacy Falls on Hard Times

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Georgie Anne Geyer, uexpress.com; via SRJ on Facebook

Image from [JB note: USIA -- see below -- known during the Cold War overseas as USIS [United States Information Service], was humorously referred by some, but certainly not all, of the U.S. foreign policy "community" (as this rather vague entity is often labeled as today) as "Useless."

WASHINGTON -- When I think of our American Foreign Service officers overseas this Christmas, I remember a dear friend of mine, Mike Kristula, who was a brilliant diplomat with the U.S. Information Agency in the 1960s.
This wonderful little "only-in-America" scene took place in Bolivia, in a village on the Altiplano outside La Paz. Note, please, that it is not a given to be able to dance on that glorious high plain of the Andes; it is 14,000 feet high.
But Mike was swinging around with the inexpressive, square-faced Aymara Indians at their village dance as though he were at the Rainbow Room on his wife's birthday. The Aymaras themselves -- descendants of the great Inca empire of the Andes -- didn't break a smile, but you could see they liked Mike as they swung him out again and again. Now one of the Indians is actually "presidente" of Bolivia, and I'm happy to report that Mike survived, if barely.
Years later, I was in Uganda in central eastern Africa, and I instructed my Ugandan taxi driver to please take me to the American Embassy.
As we grew closer, I realized he was slowing down too far away from the building for me to walk to it. Then he stopped. "It scares me," he said simply.
I looked at the embassy, which resembled a gray prison. "You know," I said to him, "it scares me, too." Then I got out and walked up the hill to my appointment.
When Mike Kristula was so humanly representing America in the '60s and '70s, our embassies in most countries were right on the streets. One could stand on the sidewalk and ring the bell and a Marine peeked out. I don't remember any major bombings or shootings in our embassies in those years.
Indeed, a favorite spot for citizens of the countries involved were the U.S.I.A. libraries [see] , most often on the street level in the capitals on a nice corner lot where everyone could find them.
Today, there are no more libraries. No more street entrances to anything American. No more fun, really.
It is sad that we don't pay more attention to the Foreign Service. Luckily, a young political analyst, Nicholas Kralev, who emigrated from Bulgaria to the U.S., has accomplished the well-nigh impossible task of writing a highly readable book on the service, "America's Other Army: The U.S. Foreign Service and 21st-Century Diplomacy."
For the book and for speeches all over the world, he has interviewed every major secretary of state in our times, visited 77 embassies worldwide and spoken to 600 career diplomats. America's favorite diplomat, Thomas R. Pickering, now retired, calls the book the "seminal work on the Foreign Service."
Kralev's concerns are serious ones, as he outlined in an interview with me:
There is too little training for the traditional Foreign Service today. (Successful applicants have only five weeks of training.) "Diversity," or the Republicans' hated "political correctness," has become the magic word in choosing future diplomats. ("Because of diversity, you now see nurses, parole officers, restaurant managers and bouncers as diplomats," Kralev said. "The exams are now very general. You can pass them without studying international relations.")
Because of certain American leaders' propensity to invade other countries, many in the White House believe that our diplomats are not good enough to face world problems (which they themselves have created), and so they depend more and more upon the military. (President Obama, for instance, meets for breakfast once a week with his secretary of state and with his military advisers every day. The Pentagon budget is $500 billion a year; the State Department's is $50 billion.)
And, of course, the military has a slight edge on "muscle," with 1.3 million uniformed soldiers while the State Department has only 14,000 regular officers.
Accepting an award at the American Academy of Diplomacy Awards Luncheon in November, the popular and respected William J. Burns acknowledged the problems. He spoke about "terrorists steadily eroding the near-monopoly of states on power ... and in which the roles of force and diplomacy have too often been inverted, with force a tool of first resort and diplomacy as its enabler, rather than diplomacy as our tool of first resort."
He summed up: "After more than a decade dominated by two costly conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan ... America needs a core of professional diplomats with the skills and experience to pursue American interests abroad by measures short of war."
Poll after poll and debate after debate -- not to speak of the promising recent nuclear agreement with Iran and the amazing global warming agreement in Paris -- show that this is what the American people want and that we CAN do it, if we release the WILL to do it. Let's get started!


Guidelines for kids who move back home to gain their financial footing: Note for a lecture, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United"

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washingtonpost.com

 Columnist  

It is well documented that the American middle class is shrinking.
The Pew Research Center said recently that after four decades as the nation’s economic majority, “the American middle class is now matched in number by those in the economic tiers above and below it.”
Michelle Singletary writes the nationally syndicated personal finance column, “The Color of Money.”View Archive
Not only that, in 2015, 20 percent of adults were in the lowest income tier, compared with 16 percent in 1971, Pew found.
If you’re in the middle or lower tiers, what do you do with this information?
Maybe it’s time to embrace a new normal, at least where it concerns your adult children starting out. Consider the message young people get when we say:
●“As soon as you’re 18, you’re out of here.”
●“When you graduate from college, you’re on your own.”
The American model of living on your own so you can learn to be financially independent is just not sustainable for a lot of folks. Does everybody need his or her own home?
I was thinking about this question after getting an email from a reader from Maryland named John. His daughter is a recent college graduate. John said he and his wife are proud of her accomplishments and they enjoy having her “back in the nest.” The daughter has a full-time job.
But here’s the issue.
“She thinks it’s unreasonable that I ask her to share in the household costs by paying $300 a month in rent for her ‘basement bachelorette pad,’ which also includes meals,” John said. “She complains that she has no money left after taxes are taken out of her $30,000-a-year paycheck. Am I being unreasonable?”
Before I answered, I asked him four questions:
●Does your daughter have student-loan debt?
●Does she have consumer debt, such as from a credit card?
●What are her financial goals? Does she plan on buying a house soon?
●Do you need the $300?
Whether you charge your young adults rent or ask them to contribute to the household expenses in your shared space depends on their financial situation and goals. If living at home is an option, you just need to make sure your young adult is being helped — and not hindered — in becoming financially independent. Here are various scenarios with my recommendations:
●Coming out of college in debt. They should live at home if possible and not be charged rent. They, in turn, should devote most of their net income to paying down their college loans. Monitor the payoff. And nope, they are not going to be spending much of anything to go out with friends, shop or take vacations. That’s the price of the financial breathing room you’re giving them.
●Coming back home because of other stifling debt. Same as above. And trust but verify. I suggest monthly reports on their progress.
●Coming back home to save for a major life goal such as buying a home. Same as above, except they’re saving.
●Coming back home because they don’t earn enough to live on their own. You’re roommates. Come up with a written agreement of what expenses you’ll share.
●Coming back home, but you need financial help. Figure out what your young adult can afford to contribute and still aggressively pay down debt or save for his or her goal.
●Coming back home and using their pay to just play. Oh, you had better believe they should be kicking in to help with expenses. In John’s situation, his 23-year-old daughter does not have any student-loan debt. “We paid as she went over the past five years.” But she has incurred credit card debt.
“Online shopping is a temptation that she cannot avoid,” he said.
The daughter hasn’t expressed interest in buying a home just yet. And John said he and his wife could use her financial contribution.
Mostly, John said, he wants to charge rent to nip a few bad habits in the bud. “She’s using her pay for all play.”
It is important for young adults to learn to be good money managers, but it does not have to come at the expense of them spending their 20s setting up a household they can barely afford — even with roommates.
Yes, John, charge your daughter rent. She needs a real-world wake-up call. But she can be independent and learn financial responsibility under your roof.
It’s okay if young folks live with their folks. It’s not a sign that they are financial failures. Given the current economic reality for so many, the new normal is economic interdependence.
Write Singletary at The Washington Post, 1301 K St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20071 or michelle.singletary@washpost.com. To read more, go towapo.st/michelle-singletary.


Half Of The United States Lives In These Counties: Note for a Lecture, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United"

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Walter Hickey and Joe Weisenthal, businessinsider.com (2013); via SRJ on Facebook

Using Census data, we've figured out that half of the United States population is clustered in just the 146 biggest counties out of over 3000.
Here's the map, with said counties shaded in. Below the map is the list of all the counties, so you can see if you live in one of them.
Map of US 50 percent Census/Business Insider
And here's the whole list of counties that are shaded in.
WATCH: These Maps Prove That Americans Speak Different Languages
Los Angeles County, CA
Cook County, IL
Harris County, TX
Maricopa County, AZ
San Diego County, CA
Orange County, CA
Miami-Dade County, FL
Kings County, NY
Dallas County, TX
Queens County, NY
Riverside County, CA
San Bernardino County, CA
King County, WA
Clark County, NV
Tarrant County, TX
Santa Clara County, CA
Broward County, FL
Wayne County, MI
Bexar County, TX
New York County, NY
Alameda County, CA
Philadelphia County, PA
Middlesex County, MA
Suffolk County, NY
Sacramento County, CA
Bronx County, NY
Palm Beach County, FL
Nassau County, NY
Hillsborough County, FL
Cuyahoga County, OH
Allegheny County, PA
Oakland County, MI
Orange County, FL
Franklin County, OH
Hennepin County, MN
Fairfax County, VA
Travis County, TX
Contra Costa County, CA
Salt Lake County, UT
Montgomery County, MD
St. Louis County, MO
Pima County, AZ
Fulton County, GA
Honolulu County, HI
Mecklenburg County, NC
Westchester County, NY
Milwaukee County, WI
Wake County, NC
Fresno County, CA
Shelby County, TN
Fairfield County, CT
DuPage County, IL
Pinellas County, FL
Erie County, NY
Marion County, IN
Bergen County, NJ
Hartford County, CT
Prince George's County, MD
Duval County, FL
New Haven County, CT
Kern County, CA
Macomb County, MI
Gwinnett County, GA
Ventura County, CA
Collin County, TX
El Paso County, TX
San Francisco County, CA
Middlesex County, NJ
Baltimore County, MD
Pierce County, WA
Montgomery County, PA
Hidalgo County, TX
Worcester County, MA
Hamilton County, OH
Essex County, NJ
Multnomah County, OR
Essex County, MA
Jefferson County, KY
Monroe County, NY
Suffolk County, MA
Oklahoma County, OK
San Mateo County, CA
Snohomish County, WA
Cobb County, GA
Denton County, TX
DeKalb County, GA
San Joaquin County, CA
Lake County, IL
Will County, IL
Norfolk County, MA
Jackson County, MO
Bernalillo County, NM
Jefferson County, AL
Hudson County, NJ
Davidson County, TN
Lee County, FL
El Paso County, CO
Denver County, CO
District of Columbia, DC
Monmouth County, NJ
Providence County, RI
Fort Bend County, TX
Bucks County, PA
Baltimore city, MD
Polk County, FL
Kent County, MI
Tulsa County, OK
Arapahoe County, CO
Ocean County, NJ
Delaware County, PA
Johnson County, KS
Bristol County, MA
Anne Arundel County, MD
Washington County, OR
Brevard County, FL
New Castle County, DE
Jefferson County, CO
Union County, NJ
Summit County, OH
Utah County, UT
Montgomery County, OH
Douglas County, NE
Lancaster County, PA
Kane County, IL
Stanislaus County, CA
Ramsey County, MN
Camden County, NJ
Chester County, PA
Sedgwick County, KS
Dane County, WI
Passaic County, NJ
Guilford County, NC
Plymouth County, MA
Morris County, NJ
Volusia County, FL
Lake County, IN
Sonoma County, CA
Montgomery County, TX
Spokane County, WA
Richmond County, NY
Pasco County, FL
Greenville County, SC
Onondaga County, NY
Hampden County, MA
Adams County, CO
Williamson County, TX

Anger: An American History: Note for a Lecture, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United"

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By STACY SCHIFF DEC. 18, 2015, New York Times; see also Tomdispatch: John Brown on the War on Terror as an Indian War (2006)

Cotton Mather image from article

WHERE, many have asked these last weeks, do the rhetorical fireballs — the
raging suspicion and rabid xenophobia — come from? Barring people from our
shores, Paul Ryan reminds us, is “not what this country stands for.” Emma
Lazarus would have agreed. But while the demonizing may sound un-American,
it happens also to be ur-­American.

Well before Japanese internment camps, before the Know-­Nothing Party,
before the Alien and Sedition Acts, New England drew its identity from threats
to public safety. We manned the nation’s watchtowers before we were even a
nation.

From that earlier set of founding fathers — the men who settled 17th
century Massachusetts — came the first dark words about dark powers. No
matter that they sailed to these shores in search of religious freedom. Once
established, they pulled up the gangplank behind them. The city on a hill was
an exclusively Puritan sanctuary. The sense of exceptionalism — “we are surely
the Lord’s firstborn in this wilderness,” the Massachusetts minister William
Stoughton observed in an influential 1668 address — bound itself up from the
start with prejudice. If you are the pure, someone else needs to be impure.

Quakers fared badly. In Boston, Cotton Mather compared them not only
to dogs, but to serpents, dragons and vipers. The great young hope of the New
England ministry, he sounds as if he would have started a Quaker database if
he could have. Banned, exiled, imprisoned, whipped, Quakers were a “leprous”
people, their teachings as wholesome as the “juice of toads.”

Baptists and Anglicans fared little better. In 1689, Boston’s Anglicans
discovered the windows of their church smashed, “the doors and walls daubed
and defiled with dung, and other filth, in the rudest and basest manner
imaginable.” The most moderate of Massachusetts men believed in Papist
cabals; priests qualified as the radical Muslim clerics of the day. From the
pulpit came regular warnings that boatloads of nefarious Irishmen were set to
disembark in Boston harbor, to establish Roman Catholicism in New England.

The alerts naturally served an evangelical purpose. The common enemy
encouraged cohesion, appealing to a tribal instinct. In the words of Owen
Stanwood, a Boston College historian, the trumped-­up fears neatly packaged
the Massachusetts settlers’ “desire for security, their Protestant heritage, and
their nascent sense of racial privilege.”Those anxieties multiplied at a time of
real violence, of political and economic dislocation, of an emboldened Native
American population. And in 1690, Mather warned, New England was in a
state of “such distress and danger as it never saw before.” He forecast the
imminent descent of “whole armies of Indians and Gallic bloodhounds.”

The muddled fears produced a snarl of blame. When fire broke out in
1679 Boston, it was said to be the work of Baptists. Who killed the sheep
grazing on Cambridge Common? It had been wolves, but it made sense to
harass Frenchmen anyway. The enemies did not need actually to be in New
England’s midst. As an Anglican official snorted from a Boston prison in 1689:
“There were not two Roman Catholics betwixt this and New York.” New
England was nonetheless sacrificed over and over to its heathen adversaries,
according to the ministry, that era’s Department of Homeland Security.

In the blur of rampaging predators it became increasingly difficult to
distinguish Indians from Frenchmen from devils. One village minister lumped
together Louis XIV, his Catholic confederates and Satan, at least two of whom
were nowhere in the neighborhood. Conspiratorial fantasies came easily to a
Puritan, who found them enthusiastically confirmed from the pulpit, the sole
means of mass communication in a province still without newspapers.

Nor, when it came to subversive forces, was it necessary to conjure up real
ones. In 1692, New Englanders began to look among themselves for things
they could not see. To the “bloody and barbarous heathens,” as Stoughton
would term the French, New England added invisible demons, producing the
panic we now know as the Salem witch trials.

So great was the terror that year that grown men watched neighbors fly
through the streets; they kicked at gleaming balls of fire in their beds. They
saw hundreds celebrate a satanic Sabbath as clearly as some of us saw
thousands of Muslims dancing in the Jersey City streets after 9/11. Stoughton
would preside over the witchcraft trials, securing a 100 percent conviction
rate. A Baptist minister who objected that the court risked executing innocents
found himself charged with sedition. He was offered the choice between a jail
sentence and a crushing fine. He was not heard from again. One problem with
decency: It can be maddeningly quiet, at least until it explodes and asks if
anyone has noticed it has been sitting, squirming, in the room all along.

The toxic brush fires flare up with regularity. “Shall our sons become the
disciples of Voltaire, and the dragoons of Marat; or our daughters the
concubines of the Illuminati?” asked Yale’s president on July 4, 1798. In the
1830s it was the Mormons’ turn to subvert America. The language remains
remarkably consistent: A 1799 pro­-Federalist sermon warned of a plot to
“subvert and overturn our holy religion and our free and excellent
government.” In 1951 the judge sentencing the Rosenbergs for espionage
termed theirs a “diabolical conspiracy to destroy a God­-fearing nation.”
Throughout, we brandish our enemies’ hatred as our badge of honor. The
churning suspicions invigorate; we become superheroes when we bulk up our
opponents. To rage against the powers of darkness is to assure ourselves that
we stand in the light.

The homegrown history in no way justifies the incendiary language. But it
reminds us that the demonic plots are unlikely to vanish anytime soon.
Anxiety produces specters; sensing ourselves lost, disenfranchised, dwarfed,
we take reckless aim. “We have to be much smarter, or it’s never, ever going to
end,” Donald J. Trump has warned of the war on terror. Amen. At least we can
savor the irony that today’s zealots share a playbook with the Puritans, a
people who — finding the holiday too pagan — waged the original war on
Christmas.

Stacy Schiff is the author of, among other books, “Cleopatra” and
“The Witches: Salem, 1692.”

Equality and American Democracy: Note for a Lecture, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United"

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Danielle Allen, Foreign Affairs

Why Politics Trumps Economics

Since the trend toward rising economic inequality in the United States became apparent in the 1990s, scholars and commentators have heatedly debated its causes and consequences. What has been less evident is a vigorous positive discussion about what equality means and how it might be pursued.

Up through the middle of the nineteenth century, Americans saw equality and liberty as mutually reinforcing ideals. Political equality, shored up by economic equality, was the means by which democratic citizens could secure their liberty. The Declaration of Independence treats the equal capacity of human beings to make judgments about their situations and those of their communities as the basis for popular government and identifies the people’s shared right to alter or abolish existing political institutions as the only true security for their freedom. And Abraham Lincoln famously summed up the founding as the birth of a nation “conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”

As the historian James Hutson has shown, many of the founders understood the achievement of political liberty to require some meaningful degree of economic equality. One of the most important policy achievements of the era was the elimination in most states of primogeniture laws, a favorite cause of Thomas Jefferson. Thomas Paine advocated giving a cash grant to every man and woman on turning 21 and an annual pension to every person aged 50 and older, both to be funded through an estate tax. And even John Adams, who thought that the franchise should be limited to property holders, nonetheless believed that class should be defined as broadly as possible in order to avoid turning the new country into an oligarchy. In May 1776, he wrote to a fellow politician, “The only possible Way then of preserving the Ballance of Power on the side of equal Liberty and public Virtue, is to make the Acquisition of Land easy to every Member of Society: to make a Division of the Land into Small Quantities, So that the Multitude may be possessed of landed Estates.”

The founders didn’t just espouse economic equality; they lived it. According to the historian Allan Kulikoff, at the time of the Revolution, more than 70 percent of white households in western counties, such as the Piedmont area of Virginia and newly settled regions of Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and even New York, owned land. In eastern counties, property ownership had started to slip but still neared 60 percent. The new nation’s successful development of political equality and liberty rested on a historically unprecedented level of economic equality within the white population.

The country’s leaders, moreover, chose to perpetuate this situation through public policy. The egalitarian land distributions arranged in the Northwest Territory through the land ordinances of the 1780s may be the most famous case, but they were not alone. From 1805 to 1833, for example, Georgia distributed most of its land to white men, widows, and orphans through random lotteries.

But this, of course, is where the story turns sour. Where did Georgia’s officials get that land to give away? From Native Americans, driven out of their homes thanks to the strenuous efforts of Andrew Jackson and others. Georgia’s remarkably equal distribution of property is thus known by historians as “the Cherokee land lottery.” Both the levelers among the founders and their critics agreed on where the wealth necessary for the new nation would come from: the expropriation of Native Americans, as well as from slave and indentured labor.

When the French traveler Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the early 1830s, he was struck by the egalitarian nature of the young nation—both in its culture and in the distribution of wealth. And many in those days recognized that in order for political equality to persist over time, it needed to be matched by some degree of economic equality. This is no less true today than it was then. Now, however, Americans must find a way to achieve such equality without relying on extraction and appropriation.

LIBERTY VS. EQUALITY

In contrast to the early years of the republic, during which equality and liberty were understood to reinforce each other, by the middle of the twentieth century, it had become commonplace to invoke the idea of an “eternal conflict” between the two values, as a classic 1960 libertarian article put it. What happened in the interim? The rise of industrialization, which changed the balance of power among land, labor, and capital.

Responding to the transformations they saw around them in the early days of the Industrial Revolution, Marx and Engels predicted in The Communist Manifesto that “the proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State.” They continued: “Of course, in the beginning this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property and on the conditions of bourgeois production.” Although Marx described his goal with the vocabulary of emancipation, his cause became linked to the ideal of equality—which soon lost its political meaning and came to be generally understood in economic terms. Economic equality thus came to be seen as something achievable only via “despotic inroads” on liberties such as the right to property. Fusing this with social Darwinism, the late-nineteenth-century thinker William Graham Sumner captured the new view succinctly: “Let it be understood that we cannot go outside of this alternative: liberty, inequality, survival of the fittest; not-liberty, equality, survival of the unfittest.”

The idea that liberty and equality are necessarily in conflict with each other became a staple of Cold War rhetoric that cast free-market capitalism (alongside religiosity) as the defining feature of the political system of the United States and totalitarian equalization (alongside atheism) as the defining feature of the Soviet Union.

In American public discourse, clichés abound for expressing what freedom means. “Give me liberty or give me death.” “Don’t tread on me.” “It’s a free country.” “A man’s home is his castle.” “Doing what you like is freedom; liking what you do is happiness.” But clichés about equality are much rarer, pretty much limited to “All men are created equal” and “One person, one vote.” George Orwell argued that clichés indicate the corruption of thought by politics; speakers relying on them reveal an absence of original mental effort. But surely the absence of clichés indicates an even greater absence of thought. There are so few clichés about equality because Americans have spent so little time dwelling on the subject.

SPHERES OF JUSTICE

The first task in any project of recovering an ideal of equality is to recognize that the concept requires further specification. When speakers invoke equality, do they mean moral, political, social, or economic equality? Even in the economic sphere alone, are they concerned with equality of outcomes or of opportunity? And what do they assume about the relationships among these different types of equality, or “spheres of justice,” as the political theorist Michael Walzer has dubbed them?

Moral equality is the idea that all human beings have the same fundamental worth and deserve the same basic protection of rights. The framework of international human rights law rests on and captures this idea.

Political equality is the ideal that all citizens have equal rights of access to political institutions. It is most commonly defined as requiring civil and political rights—to freely associate and express oneself, to vote, to hold office, and to serve on juries. These are important rights, and protecting them from infringement is critical. But a richer notion of egalitarian empowerment would also consider whether society is structured so as to empower citizens to enter the fray of a politically competitive system. Questions about a right to education, for instance, would come in here, as would questions about campaign finance and electoral redistricting, which could impede the potential for truly democratic representation.

Social equality involves the quality of social relations and associational life. Are neighborhoods integrated? Do equally qualified individuals have equal chances at jobs and valuable positions in society? During the civil rights movement, African American activists often had to set aside any claim to be pursuing social equality in order to get whites to support a project of securing political equality. The bargain was, to put it crudely, that the vote, the lunch counter, and public schools could be desegregated as long as that did not lead to greater rates of interracial marriage or social relations. Of course, that wasn’t true, but at that point, explicit pursuit of social equality was a bridge too far. The Black Lives Matter campaign has now put the question of social equality squarely on the table, where it ought to have been all along.

Economic equality, finally, has come to the fore thanks to recent trends, with all the complexities and conundrums of its lack. There is now a broad consensus, for example, that straight equalization of economic resources can be achieved only at the cost of extreme, unjust, and counterproductive restrictions on personal liberty and a significant reduction of aggregate economic growth. This doesn’t mean, however, that no egalitarian economic policy is possible, nor does it excuse us from trying to introduce into economic policy discussions notions of justice, fairness, and opportunity. The political philosopher John Rawls, for example, made compelling arguments that it is moral to pursue economic policies that generate inequalities, but only if they benefit the worse off in absolute terms, or at least do them no absolute harm.

Treating each domain of equality on its own terms has its uses. But it is also important to treat them together, asking how they relate to one another and how they should be prioritized.

POLITICS FIRST

The early-nineteenth-century political philosopher Benjamin Constant famously argued that there was a critical difference between the liberty of the ancients and that of the moderns. The ancients, he averred, sought above all the freedom to participate in politics and to control their institutions, whereas the moderns preferred to be free from the burdens of politics in order to pursue their commercial enterprises and material pleasures. (Americans heard a strange echo of this argument when U.S. President George W. Bush, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, called on them to continue their commercial activity in fulfillment of their civic duty.)

In modern mass democracies, it is indubitably harder to participate meaningfully in politics than it would have been in ancient Greek city-states or even republican Rome. This fact has led philosophers from John Stuart Mill to Isaiah Berlin to Rawls to accept the view that what we really need are experts who can set up a framework to protect citizens’ liberties and material interests while they go about the business of living as they choose.

Yet this is to ask people to abandon the most powerful instrument available to them to effect their safety and happiness, namely politics. For if there is now a consensus that full equalization of economic resources would require extreme and costly restrictions on liberty, there is also now a consensus that there is no such thing as a totally free market. To function well, markets depend on rules, norms, and regulations, backed by law and the power of the state, and it is politics that determines what those rules, norms, and regulations will be. Politics trumps economics, in other words, or at least sets the terms according to which the economic game is played. So discussions of economic equality cannot be contained within the economic sphere alone and need to come back around, in the end, to the political sphere.

Discussions of political equality, in turn, can and should bring economics into play, including the prospect of political contestation around issues of economic fairness. In other words, policies that secure political equality can have an effect on income inequality by increasing a society’s political competitiveness and thereby affecting “how technology evolves, how markets function, and how the gains from various different economic arrangements are distributed,” as the scholars Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have noted. This is precisely the linkage the economist Amartya Sen called attention to with his research on the politics of famine in India, pointing out that there were some mass starvations under colonialism, despite the country’s great agricultural fertility, but there have not been any under democracy.

And there are other, even more important reasons for prioritizing political equality, such as the argument from moral equality that the best way to ensure that each person can be the author of his or her own life is by giving everyone an ownership stake in political institutions. Approaching egalitarianism through political equality rather than other routes leads to two further questions: How does one’s status within the political realm relate to one’s status in other spheres, and how can political equality itself be secured?

HOW TO PROMOTE POLITICAL EQUALITY

In his treatment of the spheres of justice, Walzer argued for ensuring that one’s status in each domain support, or at least not undermine, one’s status in the other domains. We should seek economic and social policies, for example, that build a foundation for political equality, and as a result, even though we will not find ourselves strictly equal in the economic realm, or even the social one, a rough equality there could support our political equality and permit us to achieve a “complex equality” more generally. But what, precisely, is required of the relations among the three spheres?

Political equality ultimately rests not on the right to vote or the right to hold office but on the rights of association and free expression. It is these rights that support contestation of the status quo, whether that is maintained by the government or by social majorities. The right to contract, meanwhile, is itself also deeply embedded in the right to association. But the moment that societies protect association, expression, and contract, as they must in order to protect human dignity at its most fundamental, they also secure two other phenomena: social discrimination and capitalism. Out of the right of association, socially differentiated groups form, and lines of difference can easily evolve into lines of division and domination. The requirements of political equality, in other words—freedom of association, expression, and contract—generate social phenomena that potentially jeopardize social equality and can lead to economic exploitation.

How, then, can we build institutional frameworks in the social and economic domains that guide our associational practices in the direction of social equality and our economic practices in the direction of egalitarianism? We need a virtuous circle in which political equality supports institutions that, in turn, support social and economic equality—for without those frameworks, the result could well be the emergence of social castes or economic exploitation, either of which would feed back to undermine political equality.

Rising to such a challenge is clearly difficult, but the basic issues involved can be sketched simply. The two fundamental sources of power in a democracy are numbers and control over the state’s use of force. The media have access to eyeballs and ears, and therefore to numbers. Wealth, celebrity, and social movement organization can also provide access to eyeballs and ears. Wealth secures that access indirectly, by buying media resources; celebrity brings it directly. Organizing can also achieve such access, but only by dint of hard work. And wealth can also sometimes buy access to institutional control.

Many argue that the most important step needed to restore political equality now is to check the power of money in politics through campaign finance reform or to equalize the resources available to political actors by publicly subsidizing campaigns. They have a point, but by themselves such remedies are insufficient because they focus on only part of the broader picture. Reformers should be considering not merely how to check the power of money in politics but also how to rebuild the power of organizers and organizing as a counterbalance to wealth.

A smart path toward this goal has been identified by the Yale law professor Heather Gerken, who argues for a new federalism that maps out consequential policy domains at all levels of the political system and supports citizen engagement at each level. Gerken’s project is not about states’ rights; the federal rights enforcement structure would continue to establish the rules of the game for engagement at the local level. But she correctly points out that significant power resides throughout the various layers of U.S. politics and that there are rich egalitarian possibilities in all sorts of areas, from zoning, housing, and transportation to labor markets, education, and regulation. Policy contestation at the local and regional levels, she notes, can drive changes at the national level, with the case of marriage equality being only the most recent prominent example.

Bolstering political equality throughout the lower and middle layers of the U.S. federalized political system is a not an easy or sexy task, but that is what is required to redress the outsize power of money in national life that has been both the consequence and the enabler of rising economic inequality. Liberty and equality can be mutually reinforcing, just as the founders believed. But to make that happen, political equality will need to be secured first and then be used to maintain, and be maintained by, egalitarianism in the social and economic spheres as well.

All Things Being Unequal: Note for a Lecture, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United"

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By JAMES RYERSON DEC. 15, 2015, New York Times

image from article

President Obama calls economic inequality “the defining challenge of our
time.” Pope Francis tells us that “today we also have to say ‘thou shall not’ to
an economy of exclusion and inequality.” The French economist Thomas
Piketty writes a nearly 700-­page book for Harvard University Press about
long-­term trends in inequality and, in the wake of the Occupy movement, is
rewarded with a surprise best seller. Mitt Romney, of all people, now
complains that “income inequality has gotten worse.” Economic inequality is
bad. Everybody thinks so.

This simplifies somewhat. Some poll data suggest there exists a class of
people who are not overly concerned about economic inequality, or at least not
particularly interested in having the government do anything about it. (They
are known, in statistical parlance, as “most Americans.”) Furthermore, the
undesirability of economic inequality, as opposed to that of poverty, is not 
self-evident. Even Piketty concedes that inequality “is not necessarily bad in itself.”
The question is whether it is justified.

For the economist William Watson, the answer is: It depends. His book
THE INEQUALITY TRAP: Fighting Capitalism Instead of Poverty
(University of Toronto, $32.95) is a lively and able, if familiar, defense of
market capitalism and its effects. He grants that economic disparities that
result from corrupt, coercive, anti­-competitive or criminal transactions are
“bad,” but he maintains that a great many others result from voluntary
transactions that benefit all parties involved and are “good.” Still other
economic disparities, like those that arise as byproducts of demographic
changes, are neutral. For example: The growing tendency for wealthy people to
marry other wealthy people — a development that has tracked the rise in
women’s incomes — has been estimated to account for a 26 percent increase in
household income inequality in the United States. But you would have to be
quite an extreme redistributionist to support a policy that required wealthier
people to marry poorer people.

Today’s preoccupation with economic inequality, Watson writes, breeds
an unhealthy skepticism about capitalism and shifts our focus away from the
issue of poverty and toward the wealth of the so­-called 1 percent. Though he
doesn’t blaze any new scholarly ground, anyone looking to play devil’s
advocate with Piketty­-purchasing friends would be well served by his book.

A more idiosyncratic argument is offered in ON INEQUALITY
(Princeton University, $14.95), by the philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt. To
those who think a gap between haves and have­-nots is obviously unfair,
Frankfurt poses a simple thought experiment: Imagine a policy wherein all
incomes and personal wealth are kept equally below the poverty line.
Everybody is now exactly as poor as everybody else. If this does not look like a
solution, then inequality, as such, cannot be the problem. To Frankfurt, it
seems clear that the relevant moral concern is not that people in our society
have different amounts of money, but that too many people don’t have enough.

Most critics of economic egalitarianism, convinced that the only way to
promote equal levels of wealth is to constrain people from acting freely, are
troubled by a threat to liberty. This is not what troubles Frankfurt. He worries
that a fixation on economic equality diverts our attention from fundamental
questions that ultimately have nothing to do with how much money other
people have. Namely: What is it that you want? What will satisfy you?

In this way, Frankfurt’s anti­-egalitarianism is more of a philosophical
challenge than a libertarian crusade. If your focus is on how your income
stacks up against that of everyone else, you are allowing other people’s
possessions to shape your sense of what you need and want. You are, in effect,
alienated from yourself. Frankfurt also suggests that intellectuals, in devoting
their attention to ratios of wealth, neglect a less precise but more pressing
investigation: What is enough for a good life? What, for that matter, is a good
life?

Frankfurt’s argument is unabashedly unempirical, and he freely concedes
that economic inequality, though of no intrinsic moral concern, may have an
array of undesirable consequences that themselves need to be redressed, such
as disparities in political influence. In INCOME INEQUALITY: Why It
Matters and Why Most Economists Didn’t Notice (Yale University,
$40), the economist Matthew P. Drennan draws attention to what he believes
is another, and surprisingly overlooked, example of such a consequence:
Income inequality, he contends, was a decisive factor in precipitating the
financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession that followed.

Most explanations of the 2008 crash, seeking the causes of an overly
indebted economy, emphasize factors like low interest rates, relaxed
borrowing standards, mortgage securitization — anything that increased the
availability of credit. Drennan is interested in why people were moved to take
advantage of this easy money. Purchasing homes, he argues, was only part of
it. Something else was a significant driver of debt. He finds that lower­ and
middle-­class families, struggling with declining or stagnant incomes, made use
of second mortgages, home equity loans and other such instruments to
support their spending, notably on necessities like medical care and education.

Why blame unequal incomes (as opposed to low ones) for this debt­-fueled
consumption? Drennan’s answer is that prices for certain necessities like
medical care and education, which rose much faster than inflation in the years
leading up to the crash, appear to have been driven up by heightened demand
among the wealthiest 10 percent, whose share of income grew. In other words,
it was an attempt by those with less money to compensate for costs created by
others with increasingly more money that contributed to the instability of the
economy.

Unfortunately for Drennan, addressing inequality has never been an
American priority. Or has it? In AMERICA’S FOUNDING AND THE
STRUGGLE OVER ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (University Press of
Kansas, $39.95), the political theorist Clement Fatovic argues that a
concern with economic inequality has deep roots in the establishment of the
United States. Tea Party heroes like Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine, far
from seeing government promotion of economic equality as inherently at odds
with individual liberty, often considered greater equality to be a precondition
for liberty, a view that influenced such proposals as free public schools and a
more progressive tax system.

Another cherished conservative narrative — that Democrats favor a big
government to promote social welfare programs, while Republicans favor a
small government that allows the free market to work its magic — is rigorously
disputed by the political scientist Christopher G. Faricy in WELFARE FOR
THE WEALTHY: Parties, Social Spending, and Inequality in the
United States (Cambridge University, $99.99). Faricy’s contention is
that for the past four decades, Democrats and Republicans have increasingly
used big government to promote social welfare programs — but each party has
employed different tools and targeted different beneficiaries.

Democrats, as we know, use higher taxes to fund programs like Social
Security, Medicare and Medicaid, which serve society’s poor and vulnerable.
That is the public welfare state. But Republicans do much the same thing in
the service of a private welfare state: They use tax breaks to subsidize
employer­-sponsored 401(k) plans and employer­-sponsored health insurance,
which serve the better-­off. Faricy observes that tax breaks, logically speaking,
are just government spending in another guise (both cost the government
money), and that programs like the 529 college savings account, which is
supported by such a tax break, are welfare programs for rich families. (About
70 percent of that program’s benefits go to households making more than
$200,000 a year, costing the government $1 billion over the next decade.)

For Faricy, the real question is not some fanciful speculation about
whether you can tolerate a welfare state that hampers your freedom, but rather
a matter of which of these two welfare states you want: the one that spends
public money to increase economic inequality, or the one that spends public
money to reduce it.

James Ryerson is a senior staff editor in The Times’s Op­Ed
section.
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